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Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, one of the world's strongest oil
producing industries was divided into a few major oil provinces. The Russian energy
industry has been adversely affected by this process. The process of change to the former
Soviet oil industry including: Russian efforts to maintain control of its former resources,
NIS resource development, Western capital investment, and environmental issues in the
major oil provinces of the former Soviet Union, is the main focus of this thesis.
Free market world oil majors and their counterparts, both in Russia and the New
Independent States, have developed a number of significant alliances that have resulted in
several potentially lucrative joint ventures The coercive tactics that the Russian
government resorts to in an effort to pevent its former republics from efficiently
developing their reserves, and the position the United States must take to ensure these
efforts are stifled will be addressed.
A sound grasp of these critical energy issues by American policy makers will result
in the development of these vast resources in a manner favorable to U.S. national interests.
This will provide security for our strategic reserves and offer a viable alternative to the
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For more than a century the lure of Russian oil has attracted Western petroleum
manufacturers "The Tsar, after 1873 had allowed foreign interests to prospect for oil in
the Caucasus, a source that seemed more extensive than Pennsylvania's one [productive
field]...". * By the end of 1893 regular shipments of Russian oil were consigned by the
Shell Oil Company. Thus, the history of western business activity with respect to Russian
oil is long-standing. Historically, foreigners have been able to buy oil from Russia at a
better price than from the Middle East. This is, arguably, the main reason why the world's
oil majors are competing for domination of the Russian, and former Soviet republic oil
industry. Additionally, the potential for an upsurge in oil prices caused by the insatiable
American market and the Third World's newly developed appetite for petroleum, makes
the vast undeveloped resources of the former Soviet empire all the more attractive.
According to Fortune magazine's Richard Teitelbaum, by the year 2000, demand will have
soared from today's 70 million barrels per day to more than 77 million, enough to raise the
price to as much as $45 per barrel. By the year 2010 demand may be 95 million barrels,
which could push even higher as oil producers scramble to feed ever busier gas pumps
around the globed Teitelbaum continues,
Anthony Simpson, Seven Sisters (London: Coronet Books, Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), p. 77.
2 Richard Teitelbaum, "Your Last Big Play in Oil," Fortune, October 1995 Vol. 21, 90.
Along with this increase in price and demand will come a serious strain on
the traditional system of supply. Even if it opens all the faucets, the 12-
nation cartel OPEC has less oil to spare than many think. Some big non-
OPEC reserves, including Prudhoe Bay, are declining, and others like
North Sea, soon will begin to sputter as well....
3
It begins to become patently evident how important the new economic
opportunities offered by the development and exploitation of Siberian and Central Asian
petroleum resources are to the world energy market. In Russia, the state owned company
Gazprom controls about one-quarter of the world's known gas reserves.4 Russia and the
former Soviet republics may offer the last great domain of untapped petroleum on earth,
and have the potential to significantly extend the useful life of fossil fuel related
technologies. Huge investments have already been made by British Petroleum, Statoil,
Shell International, Exxon, Chevron, and Mobil. Many other companies (including Middle
Eastern enterprises), look east to the Caspian Sea and the Russian northwest oil region.
This thesis will seek to identify and explain the significant political and economic
issues spawned by competition for control of the vast, and primarily undeveloped, energy
industry throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics. These issues include the
correlation between the success of democratic systems and free market economies, and the
increased potential for failure of these systems within the former Soviet empire without
the direct involvement of the United States' government and private industry as preceptors
3Richard Teitelbaum, "Your Last Big Play in Oil," Fortune, October 1995 Vol. 21, 90.
4Survey "Russia's Emerging Market", The Economist , April 8, 1995.
and models of the quintessential capitalistic milieu.
Additionally, based on Russia's coercive efforts to maintain at least partial control
of her former energy assets, I will endeavor to show that without straightforward
intervention by the West to ensure the success of these infant free market economies and
political systems, there exists the possibility of reunification of at least some of the former
Soviet republics with Russia into a smaller version of the Soviet empire.

II. RUSSIAN AND NEW INDEPENDENT STATES' ENERGY
RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
A. THE RESOURCES: POTENTIAL AND PROVEN.
Russia (particularly Siberia), Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are regions with
substantial petroleum resources and the main areas suitable for analysis. In a very short
period of time, the free market world oil powers and their counterparts in the Former
Soviet republics have developed a number of significant alliances. As background for total
understanding of the huge economic and political influence energy resources offer in the
former Soviet Union it is imperative to provide a detailed account of the process that led
to investment activities in the Caspian Region. This will include activities in Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, and the northwestern part of Russia, where great amounts of crude oil and gas
have recently been discovered. Consequently, I will discuss the exceedingly promising
Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli Azerbaijani oil regions, the Ardalin, Priobskoye and Salym oil
fields in Russia, and projects such as Tengiz and Karachaganak in Kazakhstan.
1. Russia
Russia is vastly important to world's oil markets. It contains the world's eighth
largest oil reserves. Russia also exports a significant amount of oil and natural gas to
Europe and is the world's second largest energy consumer.
Russia has proven oil reserves of at least 50 billion barrels, although the country's
actual resources may be substantially higher. Former Soviet Union oil production peaked
at 12.5 million barrels per day in 1988. However, Russian output has declined sharply
since then, reaching 6.1 million in 1995. The decline in Russian oil production appears to
be leveling-off, with output falling by only five percent in 1995, as compared to 15 percent
in 1994. Oil output is expected to remain at this level for the next two years, before rising
gradually after 1997.
Historically, most of the former Soviet Union's oil production came from
Azerbaijan's Caspian region, which accounted for 70 percent of output in 1941. Between
the 1930s and 1950s, the focus of oil field development shifted to Russia's Volga-Urals
region, where the supergiant Romashkino and Arlan fields boosted regional output to a
peak of 4.5 million in 1975. In the 1970s, supergiant West Siberian fields, such as
Samotlor, Fedorovo, and Mamontovo compensated for natural production declines in the
Volga-Urals. West Siberia now accounts for about two-thirds of Russian oil production,
with fields in the Volga-Urals region producing less than one-quarter of the country's total
output. Russia's Arctic region is a far smaller producer, but is the location of many
Western joint ventures. Most new development activity today is focused in western
Siberia's Tyumen region, where many smaller fields are slated for development over the
next several years. Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East is another area witnessing new
developments. The dramatic production declines experienced since 1988 resulted from
several factors, including natural reservoir depletion, insufficient investment, and poor
technical management (such as the use of premature water injection). In recent years, high
production quota levels and extensive waterflooding operations have led to premature
output declines in many of Russia's large fields. Attempts to bring smaller, widely-
dispersed fields onstream to compensate for these production losses have resulted in
strains on infrastructure and low production rates per well. As shown in Table 1., In early
1995, almost 40,000 wells, about a third of Russia's total wells, were idle.
Company
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Idle Oil Wells of Selected Russian Companies
In 1994, upstream investment fell by almost 30 percent, to $2.3 billion, and
exploratory and development drilling fell by about 40 percent from the previous year.
Russian oil producers are facing a continuing financial crisis because of delinquent
payments from consumers. Large arrears have reduced the availability of investment
capital and, among other reasons, have prompted a shift to hard currency-generating oil
exports outside the FSU. A comparison of FSU/non-FSU exports is shown in Figure 3.
Most of Russia's non-FSU oil exports are destined for major European oil customers,
including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and Spain. Non-FSU exports rose
from 51 percent of total exports in 1991 to 71 percent in 1993 and 76 percent in 1994. In
1995, non-FSU oil exports were estimated at 2.4 million barrels per day and are expected
to remain at that level in 1996. In contrast, 1995 Russian oil exports within the FSU fell by
100,000 barrels per day to 700,000 barrels per day.
Lukoil, is the main Russian state-owned oil company. Its forecast output for 1996
is estimated to be over 53 million tons. 5 It is actively seeking foreign investment for its
domestic development projects and expanding its operations throughout Europe and
beyond. Many Western operators believe if they do not have a foot in Russia's door in the
near future, they will be missing out on one of the industry's greatest investment
opportunities for the twenty-first century. This private company is trying to integrate all
stages of the business from exploration to running gasoline stations. Lukoil sold a 1 5%
share of the company to foreign investors in order to raise $3 billion to invest in
development of new fields. This investment and development increased the value of the
company 82% to $20 billion. In the meantime, Lukoil has (through manipulation of the
Russian owned pipeline network) put pressure on the Sate Oil Company of Azerbaijan
(SOCAR) to include it in the development of the three billion barrel Kapaz field a few
miles to the east of its Guneshli project.
Major energy initiatives between Russian and Western companies are expected to
result in the development of some of the world's largest oil and gas reserves. Projects such
as development of the Timan Pechora Varandey Region, the Polar Lights Joint Venture
5U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration Statistics, Country Analysis Report-Russia.
(JV), and the North Priobskoye and Salym fields in the Western Siberia Basin are breaking
new ground.
a. Timan Pechora
A consortium, whose shareholders include Texaco (30%), Exxon (30%),
Amoco (20%), and Norsk Hydro (20%), is currently developing reserves of over two
billion barrels in Timan-Pechora's Varandey region near the Barents Sea coast (Figure 1.)
Under the development plan, investment of $45 billion is estimated over the projected 50-
year life of the 11 area fields. In mid- 1995, the consortium agreed to allow Rosneft,
Gazprom, Lukoil, and Yukos to acquire a 20 percent stake in the project. Plans also could
include a scheme to transport crude oil to ice-breaking tankers via an underwater Arctic
Ocean pipeline, which would bypass heavily-utilized sections of the Transneft pipeline
network. However, further movement on this project has been stalled for legal reasons.
The development of such a project would eliminate a lucrative source of revenue for the
Russian government from pipeline use tariffs, and avoid certain export tariffs by creating a
tanker terminal outside the twelve mile limit.
•* *forway ***&£$ Region "i*£m* 7*
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On 27 March 1996, the Russian oil company Evikhon and Royal Dutch
(Shell's Russian subsidiary) agreed to set up a joint venture to exploit the Salym oil fields
in the Western Siberia Basin (Figure 2). The Salym fields in Tyumen Oblast, have
recoverable oil reserves of 139 million metric tons, and are expected to yield six million
metric tons annually by the year 2003. Over the next 25 years, up to $1 1 billion could be
invested in the project.
Figure 2. Western Siberia Basin Projects
Evikhon was created to develop the Salym fields in 1992, since that time
Evikhon and Shell have already spent $100 million on exploratory work in Salym.
Additionally, Amoco has a preliminary deal with Yuganskneftegaz and Yugraneft to
develop the four billion barrel North Priobskoye field. Output is expected to peak at
500,000 barrels per day with the use of horizontal drilling. Other regional development
could be spurred by an upcoming competitive tender (bid for contract rights) by the
10
Yamal-Nenets regional government, which plans to auction fields containing 850 million
barrels of oil reserves.
b. Polar Lights Joint Venture (JV)
A milestone in the industry's history was reached when first oil flowed
from the Ardalin field in Russia. Ardalin was developed by a US and Russian joint venture
dubbed "Polar Lights"; proving Western and Russian joint ventures can successfully
exploit and export the nation's hydrocarbons. Six years ago Conoco started discussions
with a number of oil and gas associations in the former Soviet Union. In December 1991
Conoco and Arkhangelskgeologia (AG) formed the Polar Lights Joint Venture to further
examine and develop oil fields that AG had discovered in Timan Pechora. Polar Lights is a
unique Russian-American JV that differs significantly from other oil ventures being set up
in Russia today. It was one of the first companies to bring major Western finances to the
Russian oil industry and the JV represents the single largest investment from the West in
Russia's petroleum sector to date. By the terms of the JV both partners share equally in
both investment costs and the resulting profits. The area licensed to Polar Lights is in the
Nenets Autonomous Okrug of the Timan Pechora region. It is located within the Arctic
Circle, some 125 km south of the Barents Sea. The Joint Venture area contains four
identified oil fields that are known as the Ardalin Complex (See Figure l.)~ named after
the largest of the fields, Ardalin, which contains over 1 10 million barrels of oil reserves. It
produces from a ten square km reservoir located at a depth of 3,200 m. The three satellite
11
fields, Oshkotin, Kolva and Dysushev that contain estimated combined recoverable
reserves of 20 million barrels, are now being evaluated for development. Development of
the Ardalin field involves the drilling of 24 new production wells (11 oil producers and 13
aquifers), and reworking three existing wells. Conoco expects the developmental drilling
program to take three years to complete, with each new well taking 90-120 days to drill
and complete.
Polar Lights is currently the most successful oil producing Joint Venture in
Russia. Ardalin output is expected to peak at 25,000 barrels per day in 1996, and by 1997
the Oshkotin, Kolva, and Dyusushev satellite fields are scheduled to come on-line. Conoco
currently has invested over $375 million and plans to spend up to two billion dollars in
regional field development.
c. West Siberia: The Fields ofthe Future
Conoco and AG are considering the possible future development of other
oil fields in the northern Timan Pechora region (see Figure 1). These fields, Khilchuyu,
Yuzhno Khilchuyu, Yareiyu and Inzerei, contain more than one billion barrels of
recoverable oil reserves. Initial investment to develop the Yuzhno Khilchuyu field,
including construction of the associated infrastructure, could reach almost three billion
dollars. The partners and several other companies are also considering the possibility of
building an offtake facility in the Barents Sea. A terminal there would provide Russia with
critical infrastructure in an area that has no export facilities. An additional investment of
12
two billion dollars would be needed to initiate this project. If these investments are made,
the local and federal governments could receive up to $6.8 billion from taxes, royalties and
other related income. Conoco will contribute more than $1.37 million to the Nenets
administration over the next five years. It has also initiated discussions with the US
Agency for International Development in hopes of securing further support for
communities in Timan Pechora. 6
d. Environmental Issues
The environment at these sites is extremely fragile. Located in the Arctic
tundra, some one thousand miles north and east of Moscow, winter temperatures at these
sites often fall as low as -60°C. Harsh winds are frequent and daylight hours are very
short. However, in the summer months the tundra becomes very marshy and it is difficult
for heavy equipment to negotiate the terrain. Special considerations are necessary to
operate in these conditions without damaging the fragile environment. Drilling rigs,
accommodation modules, and support facilities were installed on raised earthen pads
several meters thick to protect the tundra from heat or damage from the facility's weight.
Short infield roads had to be built to connect these pads during operations, and all the
construction work had to be carried out during the winter months when snow and ice
protected the tundra.
At Polar Lights, drilling rigs and new pipelines for the fields were modified
6Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 94, Issue 7, February 12, 1996.
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to conform with new required safety, operational, and environmental standards. Special
emphasis was placed on equipment that gives the operator greater ability to control the
fluids and muds used "down hole." This improves the quality of the hole drilled, thereby
increasing production capability.
A 65 km insulated oil pipeline was built to transport the Ardalin crude
connecting the complex with the Komineft pipeline at the Kharyaga field that is located
southwest, outside the JV area. Current capacity of the pipeline is 30,000 barrels per day
with the design capacity for expansion to 80,000 barrels per day. The 12 inch diameter
pipeline was built above ground on special supports to protect the Arctic tundra. As
Ardalin lies 50 km away from the nearest oil processing facility, Polar Lights built its own
oil treatment facility capable of handling up to 25,000 barrels per day. A permanent
complex including accommodation modules, power generation, telecommunications,
drinking water and sewerage facilities has been built to allow year around operations.
2. Kazakhstan
Many of the world's traditional hydrocarbon producing areas are fast maturing and
will soon begin their inevitable declines. This pessimistic yet realistic outlook has fostered
a constant search for new reserves throughout the world. 7 Kazakhstan, with its extensive
energy resources, has become one of the key areas for future projects. Current production
is mainly from on-shore facilities, but there exists significant offshore potential that has
7Mark Thomas, "Cashing On In Kazakhstan", Euroil, September, 1995.
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encouraged early involvement by several major international oil companies.
Output from the former Soviet republics is expected to increase by just over one
million barrels per day in the next five years, with about half of the increase from Russia
and half from the other republics, notably Kazakhstan. 8 Moreover, aggregate non-OPEC
supply is projected to increase from an estimated 42.3 million barrels per day in 1995 to
47.8 million barrels per day in the year 2000.
a. Tengiz and Korolev Fields
Investment and speculation in Kazakhstan moved along at a brisk pace in
recent years as demonstrated by projects such as Tengiz and Karachaganak, which
appeared to be progressing well. However, during 1995 they both had more than their fair
share of problems. The main issue that dominated last years' controversy was the pipelines'
export route Negotiations between Chevron and Oman over the route of a $1.2 billion
pipeline, designed to transport oil from projects including the giant 25 billion barrel
Tengiz and Korolev fields, lead to a major confrontation between the two partners. Not
surprisingly, the source of the friction was money. Specifically, it was the amounts that
each party felt the other should pay towards the project. This ended with Richard Matzke,
President of Chevron Overseas Petroleum, saying bluntly that it was clearly time for
Oman to back off or back out and adding that Chevron wanted a pipeline that makes
economic sense. 9 The debate lead to a dramatic slowdown in project spending (Chevron
8David H. Knapp, Oil & Gas Journal, vol. 93, Issue 52, News Special Report, December 25, 1995.
9Mark Thomas, "Cashing On In Kazakhstan", Euroil, September, 1995.
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rebudgeted for around half of what was originally planned). The issue was not helped by
Russia's demand for tariffs associated with access to its export pipelines for Tengiz oil. In
spite of these setbacks, Chevron hopes to eventually produce around 700,000 barrels per
day from the field by the year 2010. This number includes production from the
neighboring one billion barrel Korolev field that is scheduled to begin production around
the year 2000. According to the Wall Street Journal, Chevron explained cutting the
Tengiz's budget in 1995 from $500 million to $50 million as the result of postponed
construction of the Tengiz refinery until 1996, and limitations imposed by Russia for oil
transportation. Tengizchevroil's had forced it to constrain its oil extraction quota of one
million metric tons of oil and gas a year in the Tengiz oil fields due to a lack of other
pipelines to export oil. In recent months the situation has improved. The problem was, at
least temporarily, resolved early in 1996. ITAR-TASS reported on 17 April that
Tengizchevroil will now be able to export a significantly greater amount of oil through
Russian territory every year following an agreement reached between the relevant parties
in Russia and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan will now be able to export about four to five metric
tons of oil and gas condensates a year through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline and through
the Russian oil company Transneft's system to Europe. As a result, Kazakhstan's oil
output increased by 23% in the first quarter of this year. This will bring in an extra $450
million. Further, the Kazakhstani government has sold half of its 50% share in
16
Tengizchevroil to Mobil, whereas Chevron retains its 50% share. 10 This could have a
major impact on the expedition of talks and the resolution of the pipeline route.
b. Offshore Caspian Fields
The major development in the offshore arena was the formation of the
KazakhstanCaspShelf consortium, which is made up of the state oil firm KCS, Agip
SPA., British Gas, the BP/Statoil Alliance, Mobil, Shell and Total. A Pre-production
program was carried out last year to set the parameters for this year's shoot, while another
survey of 25,000 square km of the deepwater southern section of the Caspian is also now
under way. Offshore rewards could be significant. It is predicted by Kazakhstan's energy
department that it will locate between 40 billion and 100 billion barrels of crude oil and 1.5
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
In Kazakhstan there are five sedimentary basins with proven oil and gas
indicators: the deposits at Precaspian, South Mangyshlak, North Ustyurk-Buzashki,
Turgai and Chu-Saruso. All of the republic's major proven and probable reserves are
concentrated in these basins. There are also nine other sedimentary basins in the country
that show promise for oil and gas deposits, and are estimated to contain up to an
additional one billion tons. Although these are not confirmed reserves, there seems to be a
general "gut feeling" that this sector is viable and provide strong incentives for Western
investment. 11
^The Financial Times, 18 April 1996.
1
1
As a result of seismic explorations of the Caspian Sea continental shelf conducted by the Caspian Sea
17
The most significant potential for actual exploitation of Kazakh oil is
offshore in the North Caspian. Offshore technology in Kazakhstan is limited, and based on
their experiences in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea respectively, U.S., British, and
Norwegian investors have the clear advantage in this market. The decline in production
from established fields is estimated to begin around 2010-2012. Development of offshore
fields in West Kazakhstan could more than triple the industry's longevity. This would
allow Kazakhstan to boost current levels of oil production substantially and use oil
revenues to improve aging infrastructures and technologies. Provided the CPC's pipeline
project is implemented, Kazakhstani export capacity is estimated to increase from current
levels of 0.42 million barrels per day to 1.2 million barrels per day in 1999, and to 1.9
million barrels per day in 2005. 12
3. Azerbaijan
Currently, major Azeri oil fields are being developed with direct participation of
Western oil companies. The recently inaugurated project in the Azeri, Chirag, and
Guneshli Azerbaijani oil regions, with the profile of $7.4 billion, 13 deserves special
attention.
Consortium, Kazakhstani authorities estimate crude oil reserves of 10 billion metric tons and 2 trillion
cubic meters of natural gas, Reuters reported on 26 June. If confirmed, these offshore oil reserves would
be 10 times bigger than those of its onshore Tengiz oilfield and exceed Russia's entire oil reserves of 6.7
billion tons, Reuters added, citing British Petroleum's (BP) Statistical Review. However, Caspian Sea
Consortium members, such as British Gas, BP, Agip, Mobil, Shell and others say that as no drilling has
taken place yet, the estimated oil deposits are unlikely to exceed 4 billion tons (data reported in OMRI
Daily Digest: August 1996).
l^Mark Thomas, "Cashing On In Kazakhstan", Euroil, September, 1995.
* 3Mark Thomas, Euroil, "Breaking Into Baku", vol. 6 issue 9, May 1995.
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a. Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli Oil Regions
All the affiliate nations involved in the development of the fields have
approached the project optimistically (despite its highly speculative nature). There are
many, and in some cases extremely significant, questions that surround the project.
Proceeding with plans to develop petroleum resources where the export route out of the
region is in question could be seen as unjustifiable. However, the potential return on
investment from participation in this and other projects in the former Soviet republics is
exceptional and thus perceived as worth the risk. It is estimated that well over five billion
dollars will be spent on capital investment in offshore field development in the former
Soviet Union by the turn of the century. 14 Understandably, Western investors are anxious
to see their first effort come on-line successfully, and there is no reason to think it
shouldn't go well. The technology required to exploit the four billion barrels of oil
concentrated in three fields has been proved reliable. Some existing platforms will be
upgraded, and some new ones will be constructed at Baku's fabrication yards in the Azeri
capital. 15 The structures will be simple and lightweight in design. Since the Caspian Sea is
shallow and the weather is comparatively benign there is no requirement to duplicate the
expensive, heavier duty, North Sea typical installations. Horizontal drilling — now a
standard and highly economical technology — is likely to be used to improve production
from the reservoirs. Existing vertical wells on the Guneshli field, for example, have
14 Ibid.
l^Mark Thomas, Euroil, "Breaking Into Baku", vol. 6 issue 9, May 1995.
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produced, according to one project source, at 400 barrels per day, whereas horizontal
wells are expected to boost this figure to around the 4000-5000 barrels per day mark.
Additionally, the existing vertical wells could still be utilized with the proper bottom hole
equipment to deal with problems such as sand migration common in Azerbaijan. 16
A 30-month minimum work program was agreed upon by the Azerbaijani
State Oil Company (SOCAR) (which currently owns a 20% share of the deal), and the
consortium (AMOCO- 17.01%, BP-17.1267%, Statoil-8.5633%, Delta Nimir Khazar-
1.68%, McDermott-2.45%, Pennzoil-9.8175%, Ramco-2.0825%, TPAO-1.75%,
UNOCAL-9.52%, and Lukoil-10%) which owns the remaining 80%. The original goal of
the $150 million first stage of the operation was to begin production within 18 months.
This meant the development's operating contractor — the Azerbaijan International
Operating Company (AIOC) — was given just six months (until June of 1995) to prepare
before making a decision on whether to proceed. Two steering committee meetings are
held each year to approve the project's budget and work program, which has so far
included activities such as rig, vessel, and platform inspections, and a seabed survey.
Specifically, a 3D seismic shoot over the whole of the contract area was started in the
summer of 1995 using vessels already based in the Caspian, and a base line environmental
study was carried out in conjunction with Azerbaijan's State Ecology Committee, so that
project participants have a reference from which to monitor conditions in the contract area
16Ibid.
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during construction and initial production. Furthermore, a survey of the Chirag I platform,
as well as the undersea pipelines to shore, was successfully conducted by Brown & Root
Contracting to verify hardware integrity. An estimated twelve wells are likely to be drilled
on Chirag. The eventual full scale development of the fields will involve around twelve
drilling platforms and two processing platforms. 17 Once all three fields are developed,
production should peak, and level off, at a figure of around 700,000 barrels per day
around the year 2010, but a new main pipeline will be needed once production reaches the
200,000-300,000 barrels per day figure. Azerbaijan International Operating Company
(AIOC) stresses that no decision on a main pipeline export route (or routes) have been
made, and they will only be considered once the initial production facility is successfully
completed and running. 18
In some previous energy industry operations in the former Soviet Union,
corruption has been rampant causing project delays, and loss of NIS credibility among
western industry representatives. The Chirag project is under such intense international
scrutiny, that a great deal of care has been taken to bring the contractor bidding
procedures for upcoming work in line with the West. AIOC carries out all the contract
qualifications and proposes bidder lists. All bidder lists for contracts valued at over $15.5
million must be agreed upon by all the project partners. According to an AIOC
representative, "Every [contract] is competitively bid and our aim is to build up a broad
17Mark Thomas, Euroil, MAI Report, "Breaking Into Baku", Vol. 6 Iss. 9, May, 1995.
18Ibid.
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contractor base during the early oil phase, for [use] when we come into full field
development." 19
The interest in this region is extremely intense due to the potential
resources that lie outside the shallow water areas. Azerbaijan's sector alone holds a
predicted 40 billion barrels, while Kazakhstan's estimates for its sector go as high as 100
billion barrels. Azerbaijan is obviously eager to get Western companies involved because
of the deepwater technology at their disposal and the experience gained from producing in
regions such as the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Tension leg platforms, shipshape
floating production systems and other floating production concepts are all being
considered for future projects. Little is known about the deepwater section of the South
Caspian Basin but a recent seismic study by joint team from SOCAR and Chevron may
provide information about both the tectonic and stratigrafic development of the South
Caspian. Stacked submarine fans have been mapped in the central portion of the area, and
seismic amplitude and interval velocity analyses suggest that the fans are thick enough and
contain sufficient sand to be potential exploration targets 20
19Mark Thomas, Euroil, "Breaking Into Baku", vol. 6 issue 9, May 1995.
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B. THE RESOURCES: UNDEVELOPED, DISPUTED, AND
UNEXPLORED GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
1. The Caspian Oil Resources
The Caspian region contains four major oil and gas bearing basins: The South
Caspian Basin - where since 1870 more than 14 billion barrels of oil have been found; The
Terek Caspian and Indol Kuban Basins — which are estimated to contain original
recoverable reserves of seven billion barrels of oil; The Ust Yurt/Aral and Mangyshlak
Basins — which contain approximately 6.5 billion barrels of oil based on original reserves
estimates; and The North Caspian Basin - where it is estimated that there exist original
reserve accumulations of between 14-21 billion barrels of oil.
A major study of the Caspian region has estimated that total capital expenditure
over the next 15 years could reach around $41.9 billion. MAI Consultants, in a study
carried out in association with Azerbaijan's State Oil Company (SOCAR), predicts that
$17.4 billion will be invested in offshore facilities and $24.5 billion in onshore production,
including $13.7 billion on pipeline infrastructure. Annual capital expenditure is expected to
peak at around $4.6 billion. 21
As a comparison, expenditure in the UK sector of the North Sea is forecast to
amount to $4.3 billion in two years time (although exploration and appraisal is excluded
from this figure). Additionally the report states:
21Mark Thomas, MAI Report, "Breaking Into Baku", Euroil
,
Vol. 6 Iss. 9, May, 1995.
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The Caspian region ranks as one of the top 10 petroleum provinces in the
world. As many of the traditional areas reflect maturation of assets and
declining production the region, with its close links to Russian industry
now open, represents an important new opportunity for manufacturers and
suppliers of oil-field equipment and services 22
Overall remaining reserves in the region, according to the report, are estimated at
32 billion barrels of oil. The Caspian region is almost uniquely characterized by the
existence of large unexploited offshore hydrocarbon accumulations in a mature oil and gas
province, together with extensive mature assets.
In the Kazakh area in particular, most opportunities arise out of new project
developments, rather than those like the giant Tengiz and Karachaganak fields, which are
based on expansion of earlier Russian projects. Economic development of these much
smaller fields producing around 10,000 barrels per day is proving possible and lucrative, as
in the case of the Armenia field. Overall, the petroleum potential of the region is huge,
with the presence of a large number of un-drilled structures being well documented. It is
estimated that unrisked reserves of between 10-20 billion barrels exist in the North
Caspian with perhaps as much as 20 billion barrels in the South Caspian.23
Armed with the security of the revenue from established energy industries, Russia
and Iran continue to press for cooperative, multinational development of Caspian Sea oil
and gas. Conversely, Azerbaijan has no alternative for revenue, and isn't waiting on a
regional solution. In a unilateral effort to step up development of the Caspian, on March 1,
22Mark Thomas, Euroil, "Breaking Into Baku", vol. 6 issue 9, May 1995.
23 Ibid.
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1996 the Azeri parliament ratified a November 1995 production sharing agreement (PSA)
between state owned SOCAR and an international group covering appraisal and
development of the offshore Karabakh project.
Karabakh, with reserves estimated at one billion barrels of oil, is located in 600
feet of water in the Azeri Caspian, 12 miles north of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli tract
where Azerbaijan International Operating Co. has proposed a $7.95 billion development.
Karabakh partners are Agip, Russia's Lukoil, Pennzoil, and SOCAR. Karabakh PSA,
which includes a three year drilling and seismic commitment and 25 year production
period, plus exploration and production options, took effect February 23, 1996. 24
C. OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN INVESTMENT
In the future, investment opportunities for the West in the former Soviet Union
will involve the simultaneous redevelopment and rehabilitation of existing facilities and
infrastructure, the development of new projects associated with existing or new fields, and
continuous exploration and appraisal activity. The region therefore has the potential to
offer an extensive and broad-based opportunity for the manufacturing, service, and supply
sector covering all aspects of oil and gas exploration, development, and operation.25
240/7 and Gas Journal Newsletter, 11 March 1996.
25Ibid.
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1. The Caspian Region
The demand potential for the service an supply sector in the Caspian regional
market is also addressed in the MAI report, which compares it with the industrial resource
base supporting United Kingdom Caspian Sea activity. As long as the market for the
service and supply sector continues to be huge, sourcing will be done on a fully
international basis, and competition will be intense. Suppliers will need to be in a position
to offer the best technically acceptable commercial bid against strong international
competition, the report concludes.
The oil and gas resources of the former Soviet Union are clearly more than just
attractive speculation for Western investors. This unprecedented opportunity to initiate
ground floor exploration, production, and export of new untapped petroleum resources is
too good to pass up. The relative closeness of oil fields to major transport terminals and
ports (with the promise of new pipelines and export terminals in the offing), affordable
prices, and cheap labor make the lure of huge returns on investment all the more enticing.
Realistically, there are drawbacks. The uncertainty created by unstable political
influence in these regions is a significant and real concern. The Russian energy industry is
corrupt. The Caspian region is rife with unrest; Iran with its fundamental Islamizm on the
south, Turkey's unsolved problems with Kurdistan, the Azeri-Armenian war in Nogorny-
Karabakh on the west, and Chechenian conflict on the north all are sources of concern.
However, the recent history of western investment in the Middle East and Latin America
26
demonstrates that Western industrial giants are willing to speculate even during periods of
serious conflict. Agricultural commodities such as coffee and fruit, and petroleum
resources have been routinely exported from these countries during times of political
unrest. The temptation of huge profit in energy has frequently served to ward off the fears
of civil unrest.
2. Russia and Production Sharing
Recently the Russian Duma has hedged the adoption of "production sharing 1 " This
agreement was expected to make easier the export of profit from the country, while
defining the concept of royalties in Russia for the first time since 1917.
According to industry sources, Russia's plan to sharply reduce the number of oil
blocks open to production-sharing with energy investors is not a devastating blow to
current Western projects, but could delay new deals.
Gennady Shalmanov, a production-sharing specialist at the Fuel and Energy
Ministry, was quoted in a Reuters News Service article stating: "The State Duma is
worried about the sheer number of reserves and blocks and considers that the list should
be reduced."26
According to Fuel and Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik, the number of oilfields
open to outside investment could be slashed from around 230 to as few as 30 in response
to demands from conservatives and nationalists in parliament.
2
"Reuters News Service Russia Desk, Russia's Plan to Cut Oil Blocks Not Death Knell, August 2, 1 996.
27
Shalmanov said that the six reserves targeted in already-signed production-sharing
agreements, such as those off Russia's Far Eastern Sakhalin Island, would remain on the
list, which must still be approved by the Duma. Three reserves in the process of
negotiations with Western oil firms, as well as about 15 blocks for which licenses were
awarded on a competitive basis, would also stay. 27
Andrei Konoplyanik, a specialist in the issue and a link between the ministry and
Western oil companies operating in Russia said, "For Western oil companies, the
winnowing inspires not confidence but rather disappointment,"28
The attempts to curb the wave of concern the Duma has generated spawned public
statements aimed at the Western oil majors. According to Peter Houlder, managing
director of Centrelnvest Group consultants in Moscow (a group that advises Yukos,
Russia's second largest crude oil producer),
No foreign or Russian investor who has proceeded in good faith is going to
be knocked off the list. But to get to the point where this law [on reserves]
makes any difference, you have to have done two years of negotiating
anyway.29
The Russian oil tsars are using their influence and muscle to manipulate the legislators.
Their efforts are designed to maintain as much control of the industry as possible and to
ensure they are included in every new venture. Their goal is not to keep Western money
out, but to make it difficult for the smaller Russian investor to become involved in new
27
Ibid.




In dealing with the question of current politics and investment in the former Soviet
oil industry, it is very important to mention a recent document passed through the Russian
Parliament. This is a memorandum which states that "necessary steps must be undertaken
shortly to create an appropriate investment climate in Russia." Through this document, it
appears that the Russian politicians are learning that Western investment is essential to the
revitalization of the Russian energy industry, and to allow the big Russian oil companies to
totally manipulate the joint venture industry, is not in the best interest of the Russian
economy.
So, in spite of the production sharing furor, petroleum energy resources go west,
feeding a European market starved for oil and gas, and providing a rosy outlook for
Western investors. A recent survey in Fortune magazine showed that European demand
for oil is currently one million barrels per day greater than the available supply. Even
though some scientists think that current known world reserves are able to satisfy world
demand for oil until 2010, the point for investors is in the lead time required for
exploitation. Future oil prices will be based mostly upon the oil industry's ability to
quickly react to constantly increasing demand. Given the political uncertainties in the
Middle East and the long lead time needed to develop major oil fields in Central Asia, a
significant rise in prices seems inevitable. The return on investment in active former
Soviet oil fields seems promising: $1 invested may produce as much as $9 of profit from
29
oil before taxes. 30
In addition, it is worthwhile to mention that market puts very low value on existing
oil producers in those regions. It is not because their value is not correctly assessed, but
because of the different way Russians estimate resources still in the ground. As soon as
financial and managerial systems are equated with those of Western producers, the
difficulties in valuation that now exist, and prevent Western oil companies from increasing
their investments, will abate. If there is a real effort in Russia to create an hospitable
economic environment, Western oil majors will most probably proceed in their dealing
with former Soviet republics and overcome the numerous barriers. Moreover, if one
considers the facts that there are still vast numbers of unexplored potential fields in Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, with potential reserves like the ones described previously, it
could be easily concluded that, in time, as the legal and economic obstacles to foreign
investments in the energy industries of the New Independent States are overcome, their
will be a virtual flood of Western capital into these developing economies.
•^Gennadiy Avrekh, Kommersant Weekly, May 1995.
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III. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
RUSSIA'S COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY
A. THE ROOTS OF COERCION
Webster defines coerce as: "to force or compel to do something." Russia, during
its Soviet era and in the half-decade since, has demonstrated a wide range of coercive
tactics regarding energy policy toward its Soviet Republics, and now, the New
Independent States (NIS).
1. Politics and Economics
In November 1993, former Vice Premier Alexander' Shokhin stated that Russia has
made a concerted effort to subordinate Central Asia to its policies and openly employs
economic pressure and a coercive energy policy to compel Central Asian reintegration.
"Russia would use every instrument of economic policy to advance the causes of
reintegration." 31 Russia's economy is almost totally dependent upon its enormous energy
resources. 32 While Russia has the largest oil and gas reserves in the former Soviet Union,
political and economic instability have prevented Moscow from effectively developing
them in recent years. During the first five years of the new republics, energy production
fell, largely due to inadequate investment and exploration, the use of outmoded
technologies, the lack of spare parts, and poor maintenance Russian oil production has
31 Michael Specter, "Azerbaidjan, Potentially Rich is Impoverished by Warfare", The New York Times,
June 2, 1994, pp. Al, A10.
320il exports alone represented 32% of total Russia's 1995 GDP.
31
slipped from more than 11 million barrels per day in 1988 to fewer than seven million
barrels per day in 1994. 33 The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the resultant political
and economic changes further limited output. Energy demand has declined because of
reduced economic activity and higher prices, although energy consumption as a percent of
GDP is still high.
Oil has played, and continues to play, a crucial role in the economies of former
East Bloc countries. In the past, centrally planned economies relied upon abundant and
easily accessible oil supplies to foster rapid industrialization, particularly of heavy
industries. Between 1950 and 1989, energy production fueled an impressive economic
growth rate in the Soviet Union, averaging 5.8% annually. Energy supplies increased six
fold during this same period (averaging 4.7 annually). 34 Instead of becoming more energy
efficient as they grew, however, centrally planned economies experienced higher growth
rates in energy consumption than did Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Countries. 35 Heavily subsidized energy prices, the lack of market
incentives, and the importance given to fulfilling quotas and achieving State plans,
contributed substantially to the high energy requirements and corresponding production in
the region. In recent years, the energy picture has changed somewhat.
33John Greenwald, The Black Gold Rush, Special Oil Industry Report, p. 3 (henceforth referred to as
Greenwald).
34TJnited Nations Economic Commission for Europe, "Energy Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe—
The First Years", ECE Series, No. 7 (New York, NY: United Nations Publications, 1991, p. 5.
35Ibid.
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According to U.S. Department of Energy statistics (Figure 3), 1995 Russian net
oil exports averaged 3.2 million barrels per day (mmb/d), down 0.1 mmb/d from 1994.
After reaching 4.9 mmb/d in 1990, Russian net oil exports fell to 4.3 mmb/d. In 1991
exports stabilized in the 3.2-3.4 mmb/d range from 1992-1995 as consumption fell
approximately as rapidly as production. During the past 3 years, Russian oil consumption
declined from 4.3 to 2.7 mmb/d, while oil production fell from 7.9 to 6.1 mmb/d. Russian
net oil exports to countries outside the former Soviet Union averaged 2.6 mmb/d in 1995,
up 0. 1 mmb/d from 1994, with former East Bloc countries taking 0.5 mmb/d. Net exports
to the United States totaled 23,000 barrels per day in 1995, down 5,000 barrels per day
from 1994.
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Figure 3 . Russian Net Oil Exports by Destination
The share of net exports to countries outside the FSU rose from 53% in 1992 to
33
82% in 1995. As shown in Figure 3., there is a significant disparity in net exports over the
period. As the NIS became more independent from the Russian economic sphere of
influence, the percent of oil made available to them declined radically. This is due to a
combination of factors. After the breakup, Russia's energy industry experienced a severe
decline in production due to fiscal mismanagement, decline in exploration, and extensive
maintenance problems. Moreover, with growing economic turmoil at home, it became
less inclined to grant credit and/or subsidies to its former republics. Still, one can speculate
that although this decline in NIS exports was couched in fiscal and economic terms, it was
designed to create energy shortages and hardship among the NIS, eventually leading to
some form of reintegration, or at least a compromise in the control of former Soviet
energy resources.
a. Post-Soviet CIS Energy Industry
Russia has proven oil reserves of at least 50 billion barrels, although the
country's actual resources may be substantially higher. Oil production in the former Soviet
Union peaked at 12.5 million barrels per day (barrels per day) in 1988. However, Russian
output has declined sharply since then, reaching 6.1 million barrels per day in 1995. The
decline in Russian oil production appears to be leveling off, with output falling by only 5
percent in 1995, as compared to 15 percent in 1994. Oil output is expected to remain at
this level for the next two years, and to rise gradually after 1997.
Increasing or at least stabilizing energy production is critical to the
34
economic well being of former east bloc countries. Recent energy shortages, in part due to
decline in Russian exports to the NIS (Figure 3), have constrained economic activity and
slowed reform. Moreover, revenues generated by energy exports from the NIS are
essential for financing reform initiatives and modernizing industries, buildings, and
transportation networks. In Central Asia, the struggle to control energy resources, the
pipelines through which they flow, and their refining capabilities became a high Russian
priority. The coercive politics that developed out of this struggle is best understood by
focusing on the history of Russia's methods to maintain control of the energy resources it
controlled at the end of the Soviet era.
B. THE ACTS OF COERCION
The specifics of Russian coercive activities are varied. The acts range from veiled
economic threats, to what amounts to outright war cloaked in the guise of Russian
sovereignty
1. Economic Acts of Coercion
With the decline of their energy industry, 36 Russia initiated what amounted to acts
of economic warfare to counter independent efforts of foreign economic policy by Central
Asian states, and reacted hypersensitively to any signs of Central Asian self-assertion.
•'"After the breakup of the USSR, Russian oil production took a radical nose-dive. With the loss of oil
resources in regions now considered the "near abroad," Russia's control of world wide oil production
dropped from 23.44% in 1989 to 10.75% in 1994. Lowell Feld, U.S. DOE Country Analysis Brief: The
Russian Energy Industry, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, April 1995, p. 2
(henceforth referred to as Feld).
35
Russia perceived these signs as security threats, and these perceptions have led Moscow
to disregard efforts toward economic reintegration based on mutual agreement and resort
to coercion in order to restore a neo-colonialist relationship of dependency upon
Moscow. 37 This coercive policy was aimed at some future reintegration based on Russia's
economic and political strength.
cl The History of Coercive Energy Policy
The policy was initially instituted in 1989 through 1991 by then Soviet
premier Gorbachev in an attempt to maintain the USSR solvent. He played this energy
card in a futile attempt to deter Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Belarus from their
republican adventures. Gorbachev routinely threatened to cut off energy supplies — a
threat he could make good on since Russia controls the pipelines and refinery
capabilities. 38
Until 1994 Russia subsidized the CIS without any economic reward. Russia
had accepted massive economic losses and diverted vital foreign trade away from the
customers paying market prices in order to wield economic influence over Central Asia.
The Russian plan was to maintain their position as the sole supplier of energy resources in
the region, and enjoy the natural economic growth and status that came with it, while
37 Stephen J. Blank, Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals (Carlisle
Barracks, PA, USA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 1995), p. 3 (henceforth
referred to as Blank).
3 ^ Jerry J. Hough, "Russia Aims its Oil Weapon," New York Times, June 17, 1993, Sec. A, p. 25
(henceforth referred to as Hough).
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manipulating the new republics' attempts at international economic participation by using
energy dependence as a key lever. 39
Russia maintains a proprietary attitude toward the CIS with regard to
energy resources. Russia coerced Baku into granting Lukoil a ten percent share of future
Caspian Sea oil finds without any investment. Russia tried to prevent Western investors,
led by the British, from operating in the Caspian Sea, stating in an April 28, 1994
demarche that Russia claimed the right to veto any exploration in the Caspian Sea, and
that oil projects in the Caspian "cannot be recognized" without Russian approval 40 This
document threatened numerous Western projects within the CIS and illegally asserted
Russia's preemptive rights over all CIS ventures. The document made Russia's position
clear and unintentionally demonstrated its frustration and desperation over the erosion of
its control over the CIS.
When Chevron went into Kazakhstan, in one of the earliest joint ventures
after the dissolution of the USSR, it immediately encountered problems with Russian
intervention. In an attempt to torpedo the joint venture, Russia withdrew its old currency
throughout the CIS, leaving many CIS countries, who relied upon the ruble, without any
form of currency. This left Chevron management in the cold, and responsible for a payroll
of about 3500 Kazakh workers. Chevron management was determined to meet its payroll
39 Paul A. Goble, "CIS Boom Bah: The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Post Soviet
Successor States," in Allen C. Lynch and Kenneth W. Thompson eds., Soviet and Post Soviet Russia in a
World ofChange, Latham MD, USA, 1994, pp. 192-193.
40Blank, p. 5.
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and sent its employees to banks throughout Kazakhstan in search of rubles. They found
the cash, and spent the night before payday stuffing envelopes to ensure payment of the
employees. Morley Dupre, general manager of Tengizchevroil, said, "We promised to pay
them on time and we wanted to keep our promise, we've managed to do it every time
since."41 Additional problems ensued when Chevron announced its plans to increase
production in Kazakhstan from the thirty thousand barrels per day produced in 1993, to
seven hundred thousand barrels per day by 2010. Russia restricted flow of Kazakh oil
through its pipelines to the Black Sea, under the pretense that the crude contained
corrosive sulfur and was potentially damaging to the already aging and limited capacity
system. The Russians required Tengizchevroil to purify the crude, removing the sulfur
through a costly extraction process. The additional unplanned costs caused Chevron to cut
back production and curtail numerous habitability projects such as dormitories and new
roads. 42 This incident, in addition to the poor condition of the aging Russian pipelines,
only served to expedite plans for new pipelines in the region.
In similar incidents throughout the CIS, Russia has used the "oil weapon"
to do its will. In 1994, Russia cut off Turkmenistan gas exports to Europe. Then in an
effort to ingratiate themselves to the Turkmenistan government it bought the bought the
gas supplies at below market prices. Later, Russia re-sold the same supplies to Turkey at a
300% markup. In 1994, Russia also negotiated with Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey to
41 Greenwald, p. 3.
^Greenwald, p. 3.
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construct a pipeline to ship oil and gas from Turkmenistan to Europe and to build oil and
gas complexes. The Russians have delayed funding and prevented the oil from flowing this
year. Currently, there is no new pipeline in operation anywhere in the CIS. Russia has
forced the use of the old system to maintain high use tariffs from all the former Soviet
republics. In order to implement the plan, the Russian 1994 National Security Statement
document urged that Russia charge CIS customers world market prices and end all
subsidies.43 Additionally, Russian energy experts desired to link arms sales to energy
interests. In April 1994, (coincidental with Moscow's desires to ease the Iranian trade
embargo) Russian Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik recommended furthering cooperation
with Iran, the end result being a diminished global power base for OPEC 44 The Russian -
Iranian connection is the main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil. The
Russian attempt to dominate the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic
regime in Tehran is purposefully aimed at destabilizing the region 45 Russia benefits
greatly from instability in the Caucasus, where wars and conflicts undermine independence
and economic development while hindering the export of oil from the region's states 46
43 Moscow, "Russian National Security Concept for 1994," FBIS FBIS-SOV-94-038-5 (supplement) (Feb.
25, 1994), p. 40.
MfbISSOV-94-076, April 20, 1994. p. 17.
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2. Coercion Beyond Economics
Moscow has gone beyond words to establish its power in the Caucasus. The
Russians are setting up military bases in the region in order to gain exclusive control over
all future pipelines. Georgia now has four Russian bases and Armenia has three, while
Azerbaijan is still holding out under severe pressure from Moscow. In addition, members
of the Commonwealth of Independent States are required to police their borders jointly
with Russian border guards, and thus are denied effective control over their own territory.
The struggle to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and
Central Asia started in early 1992. While not a full-scale war, this struggle employs a
broad spectrum of military, covert, diplomatic, and economic measures. The southern tier
of the former Soviet Union is a zone of fervid Russian activity aimed at tightening
Moscow's grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire southern border of
Russia is a region of high instability in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local
players, and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration.47
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin called for a re-
examination of Russia's borders to the detriment of her neighbors, especially Ukraine and
Kazakhstan. For example, upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in September
1994, Yeltsin reiterated Russia's "right" to conduct "peacemaking" in the "near abroad," to
47Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 940, September 14, 1995, "On Approval of the Strategic
Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States," FBIS-SOV-95-188, Sept. 28, 1995, p. 19.
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protect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom of action in its sphere of influence 48
These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister
Audrey Kozyrev and other key policymakers in Moscow. In his September 1995 Decree
"On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member
States,"49 Yeltsin outlined plans to create a CIS military and economic union. Some
observers have termed this design an informal empire "on the cheap," a "sustainable
empire" which is less centralized than the old Soviet Union. 50 The aim of such an
arrangement would be to ensure Russia's control of the oil reserves and the associated
transportation networks in Eurasia. 51
Competing political interests within Russia's neighbors often prompt local elites to
challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow's support. For example, Russian oil
chieftains in Kazakhstan and military commanders who are still in place in Moldova and
Georgia naturally maintain close links with Moscow. Where it lacks troops on the ground,
Moscow supports the most pro-Russian faction in the conflict, such as Trans-Dniestrian
ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist Abkhazs in Georgia, warlords and former
48Ian Bremmer & Anthony Richter, "The Perils of 'Sustainable Empire, 1 " Transition, March 15, 1995, p.
14.
49Rossiya-SNG: nuzhdayetsia li v korrektirovke pozitsia zapada, Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki Rossiyskoy
Federatsii, Moskva, 1994 in: Ariel Cohen, The New "Great Game".
50Cohen, The New "Great Game".
51
It is estimated that through production royalties, Azerbaijan could generate over $2 billion a year in
revenue from its oil fields, while Georgia could get over $500 million annually from transit fees. With
these new-found oil riches, non-Russian republics in the region would depend less on Russia, both
economically and militarily. Independent and self-sufficient former Soviet states, bolstered by their oil
revenues, would deny Russia the option of establishing a de facto sphere of influence in the Caucasus and
Central Asia (Cohen, The New "Great Game").
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communist leaders in Azerbaijan, and pro-Communist clans in Tajikistan. This is a classic
scenario for imperial expansion. What is common to these conflicts is that without Russian
support, the pro-Moscow factions (regardless of their ethnicity) could not have dominated
their respective regions, and would be forced to seek negotiated and peaceful solutions. In
each case, appeals by the legitimate governments of the Newly Independent States to
restore their territorial integrity were ignored by Moscow. Russian political elites have not
overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre- 191 7 and Soviet expansionism.
For today's Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as for their predecessors in St. Petersburg
prior to 1917, the turbulent southern periphery is a potential source of political fortunes,
promotions, and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a grand cause, re-establishing
the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a winning proposition, especially
in the murky environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse. 52
There are various key players in Russian coercive energy policy. These include the
military establishment (including the GRU), and Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia
(SVRR).
cl The Military Establishment
The Russian military and security services are by far the most resolute
driving force behind the restoration of a Russian-dominated CIS. They are playing a key
role in ensuring Moscow's control over the pipeline routes. The end of the Cold War and
52Cohen, The New "Great Game".
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the collapse of the Berlin Wall terminated, at least temporarily, confrontation with the
West, leaving the Red Army's General Staff, the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and
the former KGB to establish control over Caucasus and Central Asian oil, establishing a
Russian sphere of desperately seeking new missions. The biggest of these new missions is
influence in the process.
The Russian army and security services seek to deny foreign companies the
right to export oil without their control. Russian military activities over the last four years
indicate an attempt to consolidate strategic control of oil sources and export routes in
Eurasia. For example, the war in Chechenya blocked an important pipeline from
Azerbaijan through Grozny, and the victory of the Abkhaz separatists, supported by the
Russian military, further secured the Russian oil terminals in the ports of Novorossiysk
and Tuapse. 53 In order to obtain an oil route in the region, Western exporters may be
pressured to compromise with the Russian generals. 54
During its brief self-proclaimed independence under President Jokhar
Dudayev from 1991 to 1994, Chechenya illegally exported crude oil and refined products
worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. The rebel government worked closely with
corrupt politicians in Moscow to obtain export licenses. Partly to cut off this activity,
Russia launched a massive but covert military action in the fall of 1994 to support
53 Cohen, The New "Great Game".
54Testimony of Ambassador John Maresca, U.S. Department of State, in hearing, Ethnic Violence in
Transcaucasia, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess., March 8,
1993, p. 8.
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opponents of Dudayev. In 1994, Dudayev turned to radical Islamic elements in the Middle
East and Central Asia for support. This exacerbated the religious aspect of the conflict
between the Muslim Chechens and Christian Orthodox Russians. The overt military action
began on December 12, 1994, when the Russian army marched on Grozny, one of the
main goals of the Russian attack on Chechenya in December of 1994 was to ensure
control of the oil pipeline which runs from Baku, via Grozny, to the Russian city of
Tikhoretsk. The pipeline ends at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, designed by
Russia to be the terminal for the proposed Kazakh and Azerbaijani pipelines. In addition,
Grozny boasts a large refinery with a processing capacity of 12 million tons per year.
The states of the CIS's southern tier were coerced by Russia even before
they declared their independence from the USSR. Moscow incited local pro-Russian
factions, such as Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenians in Karabakh, and hard-line communist
pro-Russian clans in Tajikistan, to challenge the independence and territorial integrity of
these pliant states. The Russian military provided advisers, hardware, training, planning,
and coordination for the military activities in these areas. As a result, hundreds of
thousands have been left dead, wounded, or homeless. In addition, these violent conflicts
blocked the transit routes to the West for Caspian and Central Asian oil.
b. The Intelligence Services
The Russian intelligence services are also involved in coercive oil policy.
The successor to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, now known as the Foreign
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Intelligence Service of Russia (SVRR) and led until January 1996 by KGB general and
now Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, published an important document in 1994 on
Russia's policies in the "near abroad," called "Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position
Require Correction?" 55 General Primakov's staff argued that any attempt to integrate the
CIS states into the global economy without Moscow's cooperation is doomed to fail.
The Russian military and security services provide the impetus behind the
restoration of a Russian-dominated CIS. They play the key role in ensuring Moscow's
control over the pipeline routes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin
Wall terminated, at least temporarily, confrontation with the West, leaving the Red Army's
General Staff, the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and the former KGB desperately
seeking new missions. The most visible and enthusiastically pursued of these new missions
is to establish control over the Caucasus and Central Asian oil, reestablishing a Russian
sphere of influence in the process.
The Russian security services seek to deny foreign companies the right to
export oil without their control. Russian security activities over the last four years indicate
an attempt to consolidate strategic control of oil sources and export routes in Eurasia. For
example, the war in Chechenya blocked an important pipeline from Azerbaijan through
Grozny, and the victory of the Abkhaz separatists, supported by the Russian military,
-"Testimony of Ambassador John Maresca, U.S. Department of State, in hearing, Ethnic Violence in
Transcaucasia, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess., March 8,
1993, p. 8.
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further secured the Russian oil terminals in the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. In
order to obtain an oil route in the region, Western exporters may be pressured to reach
accommodations with the Russian generals.
In early 1995, the Russian energy industry was faced with declining
production, underinvestment, and massive state arrears that could have resulted in
economic collapse without the intervention of the West. By controlling the pipelines from
oil rich neighbors such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Moscow could cash in to some
degree on the energy wealth of its former empire. The success of Russian coercive tactics
led their economic experts to perceive a renewed dependence upon Moscow in the CIS
and a desire to restore previous trade practices, especially where oil is concerned. This
perceived dependence was seen as an opportunity for Russia to regain influence over
Central Asia through further integration with the world economy. Additionally, since all
existing transportation systems traverse Russian territory, the door is open for Russian
coercion vis a vis the transport of oil resources, and detracts from Central Asian States'
independence in promoting free trade abroad.
In August of 1995, Georgia's leader, Eduard Shevaradnadze went to
Turkey to discuss the alternatives for oil pipelines in the region with Turkish prime
minister Tansu Ciller. Ciller reciprocated and visited Tiblisi three days later. The two men
settled on an agreement that led Shevardnaze to support a pipeline route through Turkey
instead of Russia. Five days later a car bomb exploded near Shevardnaze in an attempted
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assassination. He considered the attack a direct result of the pipeline decision. 56 Russia
will go to extreme measures to ensure it maintains some measure of control over its
former oil resources.
3. Reunification
Russia has (at least economically) worked the reintegration miracle in the Baltics.
The announcement in the spring of 1996 of a reunited Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, and
the attempt by the Russian Duma to renounce the decision to dissolve the Soviet Union
were evidence of the strong undercurrent for reunification that still exists in Russia half a
decade after the formation of the CIS.
On 10 July, 1996, Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadii Seleznev stated, "Now
that Russian presidential elections are over, integration with Belarus should be a top
priority." 57 Seleznev, who was in Minsk heading up a Duma delegation, met with
Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. He described Lukashenka as a "locomotive
bringing our two countries together." The same day, Lukashenka said opposition forces in
Belarus could not create "a quarrel between me and Boris Yeltsin, our Belarus and
Russia." He said the opposition also would not be able to isolate Belarus from the West. A
working group has been created to help synchronize economic reform between Russia and
Belarus. The group should complete its work by the end of 1997. Despite the hedging by
Lukashenka, there are strong possibilities that economic and military ties between the two
5
"Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times: Editorial, September 13, 1995.
57ITAR-TASS News Service, 10, July, 1996.
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nations will strengthen.
cl Denouncement ofthe Belovezhskaya Pushcha Accord
Challenging the authority of President Boris Yeltsin, Parliament voted
overwhelmingly on March 15,1996 to denounce the 1991 Belovezhskaya Pushcha Accord
that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This resolution, however, has no legal
significance since parliament lacks the power to enforce it and the President has the
authority to prevent it from becoming law. The 1991 accord was originally supported by
the Communist party. Mr. Yeltsin responded angrily to Parliament's action in a televised
address. In it, he called on the Ambassadors from the former Soviet states to tell their
leaders that the resolution was nonsense. He went on to accuse the Communists of trying
to disrupt the presidential elections with this ploy. Former Soviet Republics were quick to
condemn the action. Reformist deputies were also dismissive. Grigory Yavlinsky,
presidential contender, agreed that the decision would have no legal effect and accused the
Communists of playing on people's emotions and sense of nostalgia, stating "All this talk
of red flags and national anthems does nothing to help the real process of integration."
Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee said, "This will
serve to alarm the West and destroy the myth of Zyuganov as a social democrat." and that
while the resolution would have no internal consequences, it could serve to hurt, more
than help, the Communist party leader Gennadi Zyuganov's attempts to pacify the West.
However, even those who spoke against the resolution emphasized their commitment to
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integration of the former Soviet States in some form. With the June presidential elections
on the horizon, no speaker was prepared to defend the 1991 accords as a triumph for
national self-determination.
Former President Mikhail Gorbachev, whose tenure in office was
effectively brought to an end by the Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords, accused the Duma of
failing to take into account the realities of the current situation stating,
It might appear that in my position, I should applaud this return to the
point of my departure, as it would mean resuming my function as president
of the USSR. I did not resign, but discontinued my work because of the
breakup of the USSR. But to speak today about the restoration of the
USSR, when the fate of the state is already decided - that is failing to face
up to the new realities.
b. Reunification vis-a-vis Ethnicity and Language
Russia has further insinuated its influence over the former Soviet republics
through the concept of Russian citizenry in the near abroad. The controversy still rages on,
but as early as 1994, then Vice Premier Sergei Shakhray stated that until their legal status
was fixed, "[Russia] will be at the stage of a transitional period, and the methods and
forms of Russian guardianship of compatriots will largely correspond to the quality of
transience". 58 This policy, which implies that Russia has a unique legal responsibility for
her citizens abroad, is another example of imperialist doctrine of extraterritoriality - the
concept that citizens residing abroad are not subject to the laws of the country of
residence, only the country from which they have come. The Russian government took the
5%FBIS-SOV-94-135, July 14, 1994, p. 10.
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policy a step further by declaring that it was applicable not only to Russians, but to all
Russian speaking people. 59
Russia enforces this policy with economic blackmail. In order to remain
autonomous, the Central Asian states have to provide massive investment in transportation
networks and infrastructure that, at this time, is beyond their economic capability.
Currently, Central Asia is dealing with economic and ecological conditions that require
immediate attention, and leave them dependent upon foreign investment in transportation
and infrastructure. Since only oil revenues (or their prospect), can finance the required
investments, without foreign interest Central Asian states will be at the mercy of Russian
transport and refineries for processing of their energy resources. 60 Russia's ultimate
objective is reintegration of Central Asia on Moscow's terms, mainly through economic
coercion.
-*" Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the
Former Soviet Republics and the Implications ofthe United States' Policy Toward Russia, diss., Harvard,
1994 (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), 36. (henceforth referred to as Hill and Jewett)
6°Boris Z. Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic experiment, Winchester MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989; and
William Fierman, ed., Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, Boulder CO: Westview Press,
1991.
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IV. THE PIPELINE DEBATE AND PLANS
A. SOLVING THE CONVEYANCE DEBACLE
In addressing the various issues related to Russian oil policy toward its former
republics, it becomes clear that one of the most significant is that of transportation of the
recovered reserves to market or to refining facilities. Thus, pipelines to sea-ports and
refineries become the critical link between oil and money.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has used its capacity to
manipulate access to crude oil transport pipelines to regulate its dispersal of oil, and the oil
resources of the New Independent States to its own advantage. It has been shown how the
Russian government has used the pipelines to coerce their former republics into unwanted
economic and political alliances by controlling the flow of oil through their pipelines to the
marketplace. The Russian government has played hard ball on too many occasions, and
with the wrong people. Western oil interests, tired of the unpredictability of the Russian
pipeline network, have begun to approach the problem, from two exposures.
1. Russian And New Independent State Pipeline Projects
Working with the (soon to be) oil rich NIS, Western oil majors have spurred the
development of agencies to fund and design, in preparation for the construction of both
new main lines and connectors to the old Russian system. This has been an ongoing
process for several years, but seems, finally, to have survived its growing pains, and may
bear fruit in the near future.
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a. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium Ltd. (CPC) was established on June 12,
1 992 by the governments of Kazakhstan and Sultanate Oman. In July, 1 993 Russia joined
the Consortium. The Consortium's task is to build an oil pipeline network of some 1500
km (Figure 4.) to transport crude from the Tengiz field in western Kazakhstan, to
Novorossisk, Russia. The CPC's pipeline network would also facilitate the transport of an
additional 75 million tons of oil per year from the Caspian region. The network is intended
to provide services adequate to satisfy all Kazakh, Russian, and Azeri demands for
transportation of crude oil in the region.
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Figure 4. Proposed CPC Pipeline Route
First phase construction, expected to cost $350-400 million, will enable
transportation of as much as 300,000 barrels per day of oil from the Volga-Urals region,
western Siberia, western Kazakhstan, and parts of Azerbaijan. A second phase is planned
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to boost system capacity to 1.24-1.5 million barrels per day, and incorporate a new
pipeline from Russia. This will link up with an existing pipeline to allow an increase in
Kazakhstan's Tengiz field exports. Initially, the Governments of Russia, Kazakhstan and
Oman were equal shareholders in the enterprise. This original CPC agreement between the
governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman had to be restructured to incorporate
Western companies as a source of finance. Table 2. shows the restructured protocol
signed in April 1996. It includes: Rosneft (7.5%), shareholders Chevron Corp. 15%,
Mobil Corp. 7.5%, British Gas pic 2%, Agip SpA 2%, Munaigaz 1.75%, Lukoil 12.5%,
the Russian government 24%, Kazakh government 19%, Omani government 7%, and









British Gas pic 2%
Agip SpA 2%
Munaigaz 1.75%
Oryx Energy Co. 1.75%
Total 100%
Table 2. CPC Ownership by Shares
Studies conducted by CPC and by a Washington DC based consulting firm
61 Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ Newsletter), Vol. 94, Iss. 15, April 8, 1996.
53
PlanEcon Inc., have confirmed that by the end of 1996 the existing Russian pipeline
system will be unable to handle the growing export needs of Russia, Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan and other former Soviet republics.62 In a protocol signed by Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Oman on 11 March 1996, Russia and Kazakhstan guaranteed to ship
minimum volumes of crude oil through the Phase I pipeline, assuring its financial viability.
Oman agreed to provide all the equity and guaranteed the availability of financing for
Phase I. The CPC Phase I pipeline system will fulfill a critical need for oil export capacity
from Russia by enabling additional oil to be exported to international markets. Thus,
providing a significant increase in revenue for the Russian government.
In May of 1996, ten international engineering, procurement, and
construction firms were invited to submit bids for completion of CPC's Phase I facilities.
After a review, in July of 1995 Chevron, as a major potential user of this developing
network, agreed to proceed with detailed discussions with Willbros/Saipem and the CPC
at a board meeting which was held in London. In January of 1996, the contract to build
the first phase of the pipeline, from the southern Russian town of Kropotkin to a new sea
terminal north of Novorossiisk on the Black Sea, went to the U.S. -Italian joint venture
Willbros & Saipem. 63
^Lowell Bezanis and Liz Fuller, Open Media Research Institute, Caspian Pipeline Consortium Reborn,




Reuters News Service Article, Moscow, Sept 25, 1996 (henceforth referred to as
Browning).
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In the past several years, there has been a great deal of negotiation and
speculation as to the possible export routes for oil flow to the Western market, and as of
this writing, construction has not been initiated. The negotiations continue, agreements are
amended, and more players included. The CPC is considering the options of routing the
pipeline to the north to Russia, south to Iran, or west to Georgia, and it seems more and
more likely that the first phase may involve not one but two initial export routes for the
oil. 64 Recently, the CPC revised upward the amount of oil it initially plans to move once
the first phase of the $1.2 billion link is built. The CPC now hopes to transport in the
initial stage up to 28 million tons a year by the end of 1997 vice the original amount of 15
million tons. 65 According to Ed Smith, general director of the CPC and a project
executive at the Oman Oil Company,
We're now looking at a higher system, a higher capacity, and the
risk allocation has changed, there are a multitude of issues that need to be
worked out that make it a challenge to finish restructuring September 30. 66
Another Western executive at CPC said the consortium was working to
restructure ownership so that U.S. companies directly or indirectly have at least a 30
percent stake to take advantage of a U.S. -Russian tax treaty reducing tax burdens.
Currently the U.S. firms have just under 30 percent. 67 Further, he states,






strategy," referring to calls by Chevron and Mobil to build the pipeline in one go instead of
in stages. "It's probably appropriate to look at rebidding the job." 68
The CPC's project to send the oil through an as yet "paper" pipeline around
the Caspian Sea, across Russia and to the Black Sea, abounds with complex financing and
geo-political issues.
CPC planned to begin construction this year and complete the pipeline by
2000, but industry sources say that time frame is unrealistic. "The roughest edge is the
taxation and liability issue," said one source in CPC, referring to profits, local and value-
added taxes. "Earlier, CPC had been considered tax exempt, but now it might have to pay
taxes."69 This is not entirely true. The "roughest edge" may be the legal aspects of
ownership of the oil rights in the Caspian. There are great divergences in the interpretation
of these rights among the various consortiums. The specifics of Caspian oil rights will be
discussed later in the thesis.
b. The Azerbaijan International Operating Company(AIOC)
There is no oil pipeline today capable of transporting crude from
Azerbaijan to the marketplace. An eleven company consortium, including five U.S. firms,
has been formed to develop the Azerbaijani oil fields and build the pipeline. The problem is
to successfully negotiate an agreement for the routing of the pipeline. A lot of power and a
^Chevron and Mobil, with no way to export oil from their giant Tengizchevroil (TCO) project in
Kazakhstan, are eager for the pipeline to be built, since problems in securing an export route have kept
them from increasing output as planned.
"^Browning.
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lot of money are riding on the answer.
At a mid-February 1996 meeting in Houston, AIOC Executive Vice
President E.F. McHaffie unveiled a plan for Caspian development. In the fall of 1995,
AIOC partners agreed to a $7.95 billion development program for its Caspian Sea tract.
The plan included minimum obligatory spending of $150 million through mid- 1997 to
evaluate the acreage. Activity funded by the appraisal program included collecting 3D
seismic data over the area, surveying the seabed, compiling baseline environmental data,
analyzing an existing platform in Chirag field, and evaluating possible export routes for
early production from the area. AIOC also expects to spend an additional $350 million
through mid-2000 to refurbish the Chirag platform, equip it for drilling, and drill 20 wells
from the structure. With costs of past and future bonuses, operating costs in advance of
first production, and general administrative expenses, total early oil phase spending could
amount to as much as $1 billion. Main development in the three fields is to occur in three
phases costing $2.1 billion, $1.85 billion, and $3.5 billion, respectively. AIOC estimates
reserves of its Caspian Sea acreage at about 3.8 billion barrels of oil, Caspian regional
reserves at 12 billion barrels, and undiscovered regional resources at another 37 billion
barrels. AIOC expects production from Guneshli, Chirag, and Azeri fields to peak in 2010
at about 700,000 barrels per day. In light of the huge production potential, and the number
of other projects planned (some already in production around the Caspian), the AIOC
decided that the oil volumes from the region should, be great enough to warrant multiple
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export pipelines.
In March 1996, Azerbaijan International Operating Co. (AIOC) signed a
transportation agreement that will allow exports of Azeri crude oil to begin reaching world
markets about mid- 1997. The contract with Russia's Transneft oil pipeline company sets a
tariff of $15.67 per metric ton for shipments of AIOC oil from Azeri, Chirag, and from the
southern part of Guneshli fields, about 120 miles off Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea. While
the agreement provides the AIOC with a conduit to expedite oil going out and money
coming in, at the same time, it effectively serves to preserve, for the near term, Russia's
position as pipeline potentate.
The agreement with Transneft will transport AIOC's crude through a 1,250
km northern route from a point near Baku by way of Tikhoretsk, Russia, to the Russian
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The northern route main line will consist mostly of a
reversed oil pipeline. On January 18, 1996, Russian and Azerbaijani officials worked out
an intergovernmental agreement that established the framework under which the oil
pipeline could proceed. To export oil on the agreed upon, northern route (shown in Figure
3.), AIOC plans to bring oil ashore at Sangachal, Azerbaijan, south of Baku through an
existing, idle pipeline as far as Guzdek, Azerbaijan. From Guzdek, AIOC will lay a short
pipeline to an existing, southbound oil pipeline between Tikhoretsk and Baku. AIOC will
then reverse the crude line's flow to ship oil through Tikhoretsk to Novorossiysk.
Meantime, talks continue on the proposed western pipeline route that
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would transport AIOC crude through Georgia to the Black Sea port of Supsa. To move
oil on the 950 km western pipeline route (shown in Figure 5), AIOC at first would use the
same pipeline to bring oil ashore at Sangachal. Crude then would move south from
Sangachal to Kazi Magomed, Azerbaijan, where it would enter an existing pipeline to be
shipped as far as Kazakh, Azerbaijan, near the Georgian border. AIOC would have to lay
117 km of 500 mm pipeline between Kazakh and Tblisi, Georgia, where another existing
oil pipeline would carry crude about 352 km to a new oil terminal to be built at Supsa,
Georgia, on the Black Sea. AIOC will rehabilitate all existing pipelines to be adapted for
the western route. At least 1,100 leaks are to be repaired on the Tblisi-Supsa segment.
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Figure 5. Proposed AIOC Northern and Western Routes
Further, negotiators were also working on alternative pipeline proposals
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alternate routes would avoid enlarging the number of oil shipments to the Mediterranean
Sea through the increasingly environmentally, and politically sensitive Bosporus area.
On 3 April 1996, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to
Ankara for two-days of talks with Turkish leaders on regional conflicts and economic
cooperation. One issue at the heart of these discussions was the transportation of the so-
called "early oil" from the three offshore fields in the Caspian through Georgia—and
raising the money necessary to do it. The concept of exporting part of Azerbaijan's
Caspian oil via Georgia was first raised by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel during a
brief visit to Georgia in November, 1994, and later, enthusiastically supported by US
leadership as a way of undercutting Russia's economic and political influence in the
Transcaucasus. 70 The US pressured both the Western members of the consortium and the
Azerbaijani leadership, to exploit the "big three" Azerbaijani Caspian oil fields and to
agree to export the so-called "early oil", which was due to come on stream in late 1996 or
early 1997, via the two previously outlined routes — northwards through the Russian
Federation to Novorossiisk, and westwards through Tbilisi Georgia. It was anticipated
that in the short-to-medium term the oil would be exported from the new terminal built at
Supsa, and in the long term a new pipeline would be built to connect the Turkish
Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan.
'^Lowell Bezanis and Liz Fuller, Open Media Research Institute, Shevardnadze's Ankara Visit Highlights
Pipeline Problems, OMRI Analytical Brief, Vol. 1, No. 56, 4 April 1996 (henceforth referred to as Lowell
Bezanis and Liz Fuller Shevardnadze's Ankara Visit).
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In March, 1996, Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev traveled to Tbilisi
where he and Shevardnadze signed an agreement on the export of part of the "early oil"
through Georgia. One key issue, however, remained unresolved, namely, who would raise
the $250 million needed for reconstruction of the existing 926 km pipeline from Baku to
the Black Sea. In the January-February time frame, following talks in Washington between
US and Turkish officials and a visit to Tbilisi by the president of Chevron, it appeared that
Turkey would provide most of the financing ($239 million) on a no-profit, no-loss basis,
and that both US and Turkish firms would be involved in the reconstruction. Turkey's
offer was, however, conditional on the Western consortium giving a firm commitment to
proceed with the substantially more expensive Baku-Ceyhan pipeline (Figure 6.), which, at
the time, the consortium was reevaluating the need for. 71 On 4 April 1996, Cumhurriyet
reported that Demirel had asked Shevardnadze to pressure the consortium to agree to the
Baku-Ceyhan project.
71 Lowell Bezanis and Liz Fuller Shevardnadze's Ankara Visit.
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Figure 6. Turkish Pipeline Proposals: The "Northern"
,
"Western" and
Baku - Ceyhan routes.
In September, Turkey finally agreed to finance cost of the 926 km, $23
1
million pipeline. In early October, Georgia's parliament approved the project, including a
$17 per barrel tariff for the line. Turkey offered two options for financing the project. One
involves Ankara granting Baku a credit of $250 million on favorable terms passed on to
AIOC for the work. The other involves Turkey setting up an international group to
oversee the project. If it grants a credit line, Turkey wants a Turkish contractor or an
international group with Turkish participation to handle the project, and total crude oil
throughput of the system would be limited to 120,000 barrels per day. The agreed upon
"northern" route, from Baku to Tikhoretsk, Russia, although considerably less expensive
at $55 million, must traverse portions of Chechenya,72 a risk Turkey is not anxious to
underwrite.
720il and Gas Journal, OGJ Newsletter, Vol. 94, Iss. 15, April 8, 1996.
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Currently, Turkey supports the Georgian route because it less risky, and is
viewed as the link to a larger pipeline through Turkey that would avoid the already
congested and environmentally sensitive Bosporus Straits.
c. The Other Pipelines
The myriad of pipeline plans and the controversies they create are not
limited to the large consortiums. There are adequate resources and energy concerns to
interest smaller investors who seek to improve on the old Soviet pipeline systems and to
expand the pipeline limited market.
(1) As a response to the Turkish/Georgian Agreements, Gazprom
signed a protocol with a Greek consortium to build an oil pipeline across Bulgaria. The
$600m pipeline will transport Russian, Kazakh and possibly some Azeri oil from the Black
Sea to Mediterranean. Some 350 km long, it will link the ports of Burgas, Bulgaria and
Alexandroupolis in Greece (Figure 7). Between 40-60 million tons of oil are expected to
be carried annually and there will be storage facilities at both ports. Bulgaria's deputy
prime minister, Doncho Konakchiev, views the project as a new concept in the transport
of Caspian resources.
The new development is that we are no longer looking at the Balkan oil
pipeline project as a Russia-Bulgaria-Greece oil route only, but in a wider
context. [We look at it] as a project of the whole region: the Caspian Sea
and the Black Sea as a united system for extraction, transportation and
realization of the crude oil. 73
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Figure 7. Proposed Russian, Bulgarian and Greek Pipeline
The Bulgarian and Greek state oil companies are expected to take a
stake in the project. Pipeline problems also affected the Karachaganak development, but
these have now been resolved following the signing of a Production Sharing Principles
Agreement for the giant gas field by British Gas, Agip, Gazprom and the government of
Kazakhstan. The partly developed field has recoverable reserves of 16 Tcf gas and 2.4 Bn
barrels condensate to be produced over the next forty years, with output currently at
around one million tons of condensate and one billion cubic meters of gas per year. A
regular maintenance and development program has been adopted with investment over the
first four years at around $320m. The initial phase, the Production Sharing Principles
Agreement (PSPA), is concentrating on halting the declining output levels and improving
safety standards at the field. Plans include the drilling of gas injection wells and installation
of gas injection compressors, completion for the production of existing wells, drilling of
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new wells based on the reservoir study, and constructing new field pipelines. Investment
of some $8 Bn is expected to be made over an eight-year term, offset by revenue from the
increased production levels. The initial PSPA, signed earlier this year, will run for two
years with the option to extend for another two years.
(2) A proposed pipeline linking Siberia with the Pacific Ocean
could provide Asian countries with much needed oil and help boost Russia's shaky
economy. But investors are not rushing in to fund it, and it is uncertain whether it will
ever be built according to SPO project coordinator Sergei Fokin.
The pipeline from Siberia to the Far East is important for Russia as it may
help it get out of the current economic crisis. It is also a major boon for the
dynamic economies of China, Japan and South Korea, which are the most
active energy consumers in the region. 74
The proposed 2,800 mile oil pipeline (Figure 8), is planned to
connect Angarsk, near the Siberian industrial center of Irkutsk, with the Russian Far
Eastern port of Nakhodka. Angarsk, is the termination point of an existing pipeline linking
the Tyumen and Urals oilfields with the heart of Siberia. Oil products would be shipped to
the Far East from Nakhodka.
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Figure 8. Proposed Siberia-Pacific Ocean Pipeline Route
The cost of the project, which could be completed by the year
2002, is estimated at $10 to $15 billion. Russian oil groups, such as NK Sidanko and NK
YUKOS, have shown real interest in the project, and it is also being followed closely by
Japan's Mitsui Industries. Private capital is needed to get the project started, and potential
investors (particularly Mitsui) want Russian government guarantees. The finance ministry
and Federation Council upper house of parliament are currently considering appeals to
give it this official recognition. 75
(3) As territorial disputes grow over the Caspian Sea, Iran wants to
become an outlet for oil exports from the promising but land locked region. At a
government-sponsored conference in Tehran in December of 1995, Iranian officials said
their country offers a southbound export route that is less risky and more cost effective
than the westbound pipeline projects now proposed. The option of southward movement
'^Reuters News Service (Moscow), Siberia-Pacific Pipeline Project Seeks Investors, August 7, 1996.
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of oil away from the Caspian has received little attention outside of Iran.
The U.S. government has accused Iran of supporting international
terrorism and attempting to build nuclear weapons. U.S. efforts to isolate Iran make
financing doubtful for any major project in the near term. Non-U. S. companies remain
reluctant to make long term commitments in the country partly due to fear of alienating
the U.S. government. Coincidentally, the day after the conference in Tehran, the U.S.
Senate Banking Committee approved legislation that would impose sanctions on non-U. S.
companies conducting significant amounts of business with Iran.
However, until Caspian Sea territorial questions are resolved, an
Iranian outlet for the regions oil production may be no less likely to develop than are the
other previously outlined pipeline projects. Speakers at the Tehran conference asserted
that no pipeline project can proceed without the approval of Russia, which openly seeks to
retain influence over former Soviet states on the Caspian Sea. 76 Although Moscow would
hardly look kindly on an Iranian outlet for Caspian oil, which would involve no transit of
Russian territory, it agrees with Iran on Caspian territorial issues. 77
Iran's southward export proposal for Caspian crude involves oil
swaps, and Kazakhstan and Iran recently sealed an oil swapping agreement.
'"Oil and Gas Journal, Iran Seeks to be Outletfor Caspian Sea Oil, Vol. 94, Iss. 1, Jan. 1, 1996.
77Both countries, as well as Turkmenistan, seek cooperative development of Caspian resources by the five
coastal countries. The other countries, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, support a partitioning of the sea
similar to the division of the North Sea into national sectors. Both of those countries have oil and gas
projects in the Caspian.
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Following intensive negotiations between the expert teams from oil
ministries of Iran and Kazakhstan an agreement on export of Kazakhstan's
oil to the international markets via Iran was inked here Saturday. 78
According to the agreement, two million tons of oil will be
delivered to Iran by Kazakhstan at the Caspian Sea annually and Kazakhstan in return will
receive oil at the Persian Gulf for export purposes. It is not firm as to when the deal will
take effect. Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Kazakhstan's President
Nursultan Nazarbayev agreed in May of 1996 to go ahead with the oil swap deal which
involves laying a pipeline to carry Kazakh crude through Iran. Since then, the start of the
deal has been delayed by differences over the cost of transporting the oil.
Kazakhstan, which is increasing its oil production with the help of
foreign energy firms, has turned to Tehran because of limited capacity in the Russian
export pipeline system. Tehran benefits from the deal by receiving a pipeline transit fee and
by reducing the cost of sending oil from its southern fields to refineries in the north of the
country.
As described by Iranian officials, the agreement will begin after
construction of only 160 km of pipeline to connect the port of Anzali with existing
pipelines in Iran. The crude would move to refineries in northern Iran. Which, with only
minor changes, the plants could process Caspian crudes. Crude from southern Iranian
fields, now shipped north to the refineries, would move instead to Kharg Island for export
78Reuters News Service (Nicosia), Kazakhstan and Iran Seal Oil Deal, August 10, 1996.
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sales on behalf of countries supplying the refineries in the north. Later, a pipeline along the
eastern Caspian Sea could connect with existing crude lines in Iran (Figure 9), flow of
which would be reversed to move oil to Kharg Island.
Iranians argue that their scheme would be cheaper and require
transit of fewer international boundaries than any of the other pipeline export proposals. In
addition, the Iranian route via the Persian Gulf would give Caspian crude access to Asia.
Mediterranean routes place Caspian crude in competition with growing volumes from
several other sources including, eventually, Iraq in markets not growing as fast as those of
Asia.
Figure 9. Proposed Iranian Pipeline
When posed with the question of transport of AIOC oil, even
though it was excluded from the consortium, H. Ghanimi Fard, NIOC director for
international affairs, said,
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Iran has never said that it would not negotiate [with the AIOC] even
though 40% of combine shares are held by U.S. companies. We have no
problems with American companies. 79
A month after the Conference on Caspian Issues, during a three day
meeting in Tehran, Iranian officials unveiled technical details of eleven projects for which
they are seeking participation by foreign oil companies. Between 50 and 60 company
representatives attended the November conference, according to sources present at that
meeting. Although (at the request of the companies) officials have revealed little about the
conference and refused to identify participants, the meeting alone is an indicator that Iran
strongly wants to be a player in the Caspian black gold rush and is willing to work with
both the West and Central Asian nations to achieve for itself maximum participation.
cL Caspian Territorial Disputes
As the financial and corporate issues in the exploitation of Caspian
petroleum resources are slowly resolved, Russia has concentrated its efforts to obstruct
the flow of NIS oil resources via international law. The political issues of the
determination of the Caspian's legal status (as lake or sea), and the rights to the oil and gas
deposits within its waters begin to loom larger and larger.
The long-term goals of all Caspian basin nations are very similar: to
develop the infrastructure and transport capabilities of the region in order to produce large
amounts of oil and natural gas for sale on the world market. The potential participants of
7
^Oil and Gas Journal, Iran Seeks to be Outletfor Caspian Sea Oil, Vol. 94, Iss. 1, Jan. 1, 1996.
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a long-term development project besides Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, include
Turkmenistan and Iran Together, these states control, or have the rights to control, the
energy resource reserves in the region. While these nations seem to be ironing out the
problems of exploitation, so far, there has been no resolution over disagreement of
ownership and control of the Caspian Sea's jurisdiction and economic zones.
The official and long-held position of the Russian Federation is that, due to
natural characteristics, the Caspian Sea should be considered a closed lake, and the judicial
norms relating to exclusive economic zones of coastal states drawn up by the 1 982 United
Nations Convention on Maritime laws, are not applicable to the states bordering the
Caspian. 80
According to the Treaties on the Status of the Caspian Sea, signed
between Russia and Iran, the participating states have sovereign rights over the water up
to twelve miles from their coast. The Russian view on these rules is that the Caspian Sea
must become a free zone where each state that borders the sea has equal rights in
developing the oil reserves. 81
Since Kazakhstan was not directly involved in the Russia-Iranian
agreement, Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers the treaty not binding and
legally unjustified, and maintains the belief that the status of the Caspian as a sea or a
°°Dr. Aleksandr Akimov, Oil and Gas in the Caspian Sea Region: An Overview of Cooperation and
Conflict, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1996.
81 Ibid.
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closed lake has yet to be determined.
Rasul Guliev, the Speaker of Azerbaijan's Parliament, in discussing
Azerbaijan's position on the question of the legal rights for nations bordering the Caspian
Sea, expressed his belief that each country with a geographical border on the Caspian Sea
has complete sovereignty over its corresponding territorial sectors. According to Guliev,
international law supports this position. 82 According to Azerbaijan's constitution, the
waters of the Caspian Sea that touch Azerbaijan's coast are sovereign parts of that
country.
Guliev believes that, as early as the 1950s, Soviet authorities divided the
Caspian Sea into sectors. This approach was apparent in the activities of both the Soviet
central government and many separate ministries that were involved with Caspian
activities, including energy (oil and gas), economic (fishing) and transportation. Russia and
Iran divided the Caspian sea into zones in a like manner. According to Guliev, after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the newly formed states signed an agreement
recognizing the division of the Caspian sea into national sectors that were formed during
the Soviet period. These new independent national sectors, correspond to the old republic
sectors that existed in the USSR.
Turkmenistan's position on the Sea is similar to those of Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan. However, since Turkmenistan is more involved in the natural gas industry and
82Ibid.
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related infrastructure projects than in oil exploration and extraction (extracting about 65
billion cubic meters of natural gas each year from its territory as compared with only 5
million tons of oil), it is in less of a hurry to resolve the legal complications and questions
surrounding its Caspian borders.
It is this confusion regarding Caspian oil rights and the controversy as to
the pipeline alternatives among oil majors that have prevented the flow of new oil reserves
out of the New Independent States. Russia has practiced its cunning to control the flow of
natural gas and oil through the pipelines it monopolizes to muscle its way into the
consortiums and to gain a substantial measure of influence in their decision making
process. Moreover, since Russia has the ability to control economies of the NIS vis a vis
its "oil weapon", it has strong motives to delay the decision on any new pipeline that




V. INVOLVEMENT OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES AND
INVESTORS
The Russian energy industry fell ill along with, or perhaps as a result of, the Soviet
economic system. Production levels of the Soviet energy industry were, like most
industries, based on quotas. This led to inaccurate reporting of production levels,
improper maintenance, inadequate exploration, and poor handling of maturing resources.
The amount of oil that has gone to waste due to water incursion alone is staggering.
Soviet style saturation drilling methods, with success measured in feet drilled per day
rather than total hydrocarbons discovered, have, in the revamped Russian energy industry,
gone the way of Stalin's collectivization and Khruschev's corn.
Yet mismanagement of resources hangs on. The post-Soviet political machine in
Russia has, for the most part, bet its survival on the revenue obtained through the sale of
military hardware and petroleum based natural resources. This desperate measure to
survive what must undoubtedly be the most profound political transformation in history is
slowly coming to end. Recently, with incentives provided by IMF restrictions for loan
guarantees, Russia has begun a trend toward fiscal responsibility based upon privatization
and free market economic principles.
A. WESTERN TECHNOLOGICAL AID
The Russian energy industry has embarked on numerous joint ventures with
Western nations. Their purpose is to bring to the table the capital and technologies
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necessary for revitalization of their industry and, at the same time, to maintain a strong
foothold in the management of their energy resources. In the West, both capital and
technology abound that can facilitate the exploration, development and exploitation of
new reserves and breath new life into mature fields previously thought to be tapped out.
Western oil concerns are, for the right price, more than willing to share their technologies
and marketing strategies with Russia in order to bring the Russian energy industry up to
(and beyond) the level of production experienced during the 1980s. It is, after all, to the
advantage of the West to ensure the success of free markets and democratic rule in Russia
and the New Independent States.
1. Refineries
Russian refineries currently operate at about 50% capacity (compared with more
than 90% in the U.S. and 80% in western Europe). Technology exists that, if
implemented, would allow Russia's refiners to increase their total crude distillation
capacity by more than 500,000 barrels per day by the year 2000. 83 Russia's refiners face
problems of low plant utilization, an unsustainable product mix, high distribution costs,
and squeezed margins because of increased crude oil prices, and pollution. Russian
refining margins will remain slim as long as the economy remains weak since a weak
economy translates to low energy utilization rates. However, the product mix is expected
to shift toward lighter products (light oils and gasoline) as Russia's economy picks up.
830il & Gas Journal, Vol. 94, Iss. 2, January 8, 1996.
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Russia has 28 refineries with an average crude distillation capacity of 200,000 barrels per
day. Almost five million barrels per day of this capacity is served by a total 15,000 km of
product pipelines, while more than 1.5 million barrels per day has to rely on rail, road, and
water for product shipment. Delivery costs for Russian refiners are comparatively high
because the average distance from refinery to market is about 1,100 km, compared with
only 500 km in the U.S. In order to be cost effective, Russia must be ready to modernize
its antiquated refineries. Plant expansion and conversion projects under way or on the
drawing boards will lead to a total 542,000 barrels per day of added distillation capacity. 84
Implementing those projects and technologies such as vacuum distillation, catalytic
cracking, hydrocracking, reforming, and hydrotreating units could boost Russia's total
products capacity from the current 5.2 million barrels per day to 5.9 million barrels per
day by the year 2000. 85 If only half of the improvements are implemented, Russia will see
a truly significant improvement in both revenue and the environment.
2. Offshore Technology
It is estimated that well over five billion dollars will be spent on capital investment
in offshore field development in the former Soviet Union by the turn of the century. 86
There are a myriad of technological and procedural issues that are unique to offshore
projects Based on their experiences in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea respectively,






U.S., British, and Norwegian investors have the clear advantage in this market. Moreover,
the North Sea and surrounding offshore areas have been proving grounds for technologies
and practices able to slash exploration, development, and production costs. New seismic
and drilling technologies, a move toward floating production facilities and away from
more-costly fixed systems; use of subsea completions tied back to existing platforms;
alliances between operators and contractors and streamlined organizations and procedures
have all been proven and are available for export to Russia and the NIS.
a, Single Point Moor Technology
SPM (single point moor) technology is to be introduced by the Willbros
Company in the new export location north of Navrossisk will significantly increase the
amount of crude exported to refining facilities. The performance of SPM systems is
superior to older jetty-based loading systems in virtually every respect, including
environmental impact, reliability and weather tolerance. In addition, SPM technology
eliminates the requirement for a protected harbor. This state of the art mooring and cargo
transfer system cuts down in port time for shipping, and will allow for a significant
increase in the amount of Central Asian crude exported.
b. Offshore Oil Rigs
It is becoming clear that the vast majority of untapped reserves in Russia
and the NIS are concentrated offshore — some in significantly deep water areas. Suppliers
of the required rigs, including platforms and drilling equipment are in step to satisfy the
78
long range logistical requirements. The Sea of Okhotsk, and the Barents, Caspian, and
Black Seas are all active project sites, and the equipment needed for these projects is
highly specialized. In preparation for the projects in the former Soviet Union, the Western
offshore drilling industry has been improving itself steadily for the past year. Four trends
are driving the market worldwide:
• Technology is steadily lowering the cost of finding and producing oil and gas.
• Energy prices are high enough to stimulate drilling yet low enough to
stimulate consumption.
• Some governments have lowered taxes on energy producers to attract
investment.
• The return on project investment in the FSR will be realized well into the next
century.
In combination, these trends have expanded the market for deepwater
drilling services beyond the available supply of rigs and daily rig rates and are rising
toward levels required to justify building new rigs. 87
There is comparatively little offshore technology and experience in the FSU
and this fact has led their project coordinators to the established experts in the area.
Companies in the UK, Canada, Norway and the U.S. are all ready to provide their
equipment and consulting services. Some of the new construction projects include:
• Eight mobile rigs are currently under construction. Gazprom will own and
operate two 300 foot independent leg cantilever jack ups in the Black Sea.
They will be delivered in mid- 1997 and mid- 1998, respectively. The Kvaerner
& Zvezdochka-designed rigs will cost $100 million each.
870/7 & Gas Journal, Vol. 94, Iss. 36, Category: News, Subcategory: Exploration, Sept. 2, 1996.
79
• Rowan Cos. Inc. will take delivery of a LeTourneau 1 50-88-C 400-ft jack up
in May 1998. Rowan is constructing the $170 million heavy duty jack up, the
Rowan-Gorilla 5, on speculation.
• In the Caspian, the AIOC plans to upgrade some existing platforms, and some
new ones will be constructed at Baku's fabrication yards in the Azeri capital.
The structures will be simple and lightweight in design. Since the Caspian Sea
is shallow and the weather is comparatively benign there is no requirement to
duplicate the expensive, heavier duty, North Sea typical installations. 88
• Three semisubmersibles are under construction. Caspmor (Russia) will own
and operate the Shelf VII, an F&G Enhanced Pacesetter design for 1,000 ft of
water, and the Shelf IX, a CD&BE Coral design for 820 ft of water. Each rig
has an estimated cost of $80 million, and no delivery date has been announced.
• Deepsea ASA will take delivery of the Deepsea Stavanger, a Bingo 8000
design for 6,500 ft of water, in February 1998. The rig has an estimated cost of
$210 million and is available.
• Falcon Drilling is building a dynamically positioned drillship, the Peregrine IV.
Falcon plans to complete the drillship, which would be capable of drilling in
9,200 ft of water, by December 1997.
• In June 1998, Sonat Offshore will take delivery of a dynamically positioned
drillship for drilling in 7,000 ft of water. The Discoverer Enterprise, an
Aframax Tanker design, has an estimated cost of $245 million and should
receive a day rate of $180,000. The rig construction is supported by a 3-year
contract with Amoco Production Co. 89
While not all of the cited examples are project specific and some are
speculative, they are all targeted at the increasing demand for offshore drilling technology
and representative of the technologies that offshore projects in the former Soviet Union
depend upon.
88Mark Thomas, Euroil, "Breaking Into Baku", Vol. 6 Iss. 9, May, 1995.
°^Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 94, Iss. 36, Category: News, Subcategory: Exploration, Sept. 2, 1996.
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c. 3D Survey Technology
Exploration in the deep water environment has been made significantly easier with
the evolution of seismic 3D sonar and surveying systems and ROVs. The ability to reliably
locate the underwater geological formations common to petroleum deposits expeditiously
not only serves to reduce expenses incurred during exploration, but it also leads investors
to gain confidence in speculative projects. Earlier this year, an Exxon Corporation affiliate
began acquiring state-of-the-art 3D seismic data in the Sea of Okhotsk off northern
Sakhalin Island in far eastern Russia. Exxon Neftegas Ltd., operator for the Sakhalin I
Consortium, said the multi-million dollar seismic work is the first part of a $200-300
million resource appraisal program that is required to better define estimates of reserves.
The acquisition, covering nearly 350 square miles, is scheduled to run into October. The
Sakhalin I area is comprised of three offshore fields, Chayvo, Odoptu, and Arkutun-Dagi.
The seismic data is being acquired this year is for Arkutun-Dagi field. Similar surveys will
be run over Chayvo and Odoptu fields in the future. Acquisition began less than 45 days
after the Sakhalin I production sharing agreement took effect on June 10, and has
progressed with positive results which significantly expedited the timetable for initial
drilling. 90 The same 3D technology has been successfully used to map out the vast
deposits in both the Caspian and the Barents.
90Oil & Gas Journal, July 29, 1996, p. 58.
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d. Other Western Technologies
There are numerous other technologies that are routinely utilized in the West that
are just now being introduced to the former Soviet oil industry.
• Horizontal drilling techniques — now a standard and economic technology —
are to be used to rework many wells in what were thought to be tapped out
fields in Russia. Additionally, horizontal drilling is likely to be used to
improve production from the reservoirs. Existing vertical wells on the
Guneshli field, for example, have produced, according to one project source,
at 400 bbl a day, whereas horizontal wells are expected to boost this figure to
around the 4-5,000 barrel per day mark.
• Oil shale. Russia plans to complete installation this year of its first waste free
hard oil shale processing plant with a $1.05 million credit from a German
bank. Tatoilgas, a venture of Tatarstan's Tatneft and German combine
Mineraloel-Rostoff-Handel, expects to process 48 cu meters per day of shale
with an estimated 5% yield of shale oil. The venture was established in 1989
initially to process one million metric tons of crude oil tank bottom sludge
and recover marketable oil. About 600,000 tons of sludge in Tatarstan was
processed, yielding 250,000 tons of oil. The shale processing technology was
tested in a pilot plant in Germany in 1995.Methods such as new drilling
techniques and more extensive gas and water injection projects all can reduce
costs and reap significantly larger numbers of reserves over the life of a well.
All the above technologies and many others are typical of the expertise the
West is able to bring to Russia and the NIS. The implication is not that there is no useful
home grown technology, or that the former Soviet oil industry is not capable of
developing new technologies for themselves. The fact is that there are technologies
available for use today that in time can be improved upon when the industry is again
fiscally sound. The financing for such research and development is available.
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B. JOINT VENTURES - THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS
The number of joint ventures with foreign companies and foreign firms operating
in Russia reached 14,600 in 1995, a 31% increase since 1994. Of that number, 2,611 joint
ventures were set up by U.S. companies and 1,971 by German firms. Companies from
China and Ukraine founded 1,376 and 1,341 joint ventures, respectively. In 1995, joint
ventures' industrial output totaled 44 trillion rubles ($9.7 billion), of which goods worth
$5.8 billion—mostly fuel--were exported. Joint ventures accounted for 7% of Russia's total
exports and 6% of total imports. 91 As of July 1996, there were 164 oil and gas joint
ventures (Figure 10). This number includes both operational and contractual joint
ventures between foreign oil companies and the various states of the former Soviet Union.
These joint ventures cover all aspects of the oil and gas industry, including production,
refining, transportation, and oilfield services; however, they exclude the manufacture of
oilfield equipment.





Source: United Slates DOE Energy Information Administration
Figure 10. Joint Ventures in the Former Soviet Union
Joint Venture Production
Of the aforementioned 164 ventures, 56 are operating, with the rest having signed
contracts or protocols of intent. More than 60 percent of these are in Russia, with the
majority of the remaining in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The 106 joint ventures in Russia
produced about 400,000 barrels of oil per day in 1995, up from the 300,000 barrels/day of
1994 92 The overall share of oil production accounted for by joint ventures rose from 4.6
percent in 1994 to 6.6 percent in 1995. About 60 percent of the oil produced from joint
ventures in 1995 was exported, the rest was sold to Russia for domestic use.
Joint ventures in Russia currently producing 20,000 barrels per day or more
include: White Nights (Anglo-Suisse), Polar Lights (Conoco), Vakh Fracmaster and
Yuganskmaster (Fracmaster), and Vanyoganneft (Occidental). All of these joint ventures
92U.S. DOE-Energy Information Administration (EIA) Analysis Report, Oil and Gas Joint Ventures in
the Former Soviet Union.
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are located in the West Siberia Basin except for Polar Lights, which is located in the
Timan Pechora Region. Most of the successful joint ventures in the former Soviet Union
are smaller operations that focus on reworking old fields with new technology from the
West to increase or revive production.
The majority of the production from the other joint ventures comes from
Kazakhstan, with 1995 joint venture production of 58,000 barrels per day. The joint
ventures account for 14 percent of Kazakhstan's production. This total is up from the
1994 production level of 42,000 barrels per day, equal to 10 percent of total production.
Almost all (51,000 barrels per day) of the production can be attributed to Chevron's
Tengizchevroil joint venture at Tengiz, which has the largest oil production of any joint
venture in the former Soviet Union. 93
Large joint ventures in terms of planned future oil production include: Chevron's
Tengizchevroil ($20 billion planned investment and 750,000 barrel per day potential by
2010); the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC) of Amoco and others ($7
billion planned capital investment and 800,000 barrel per day production by 2008);
Bitech's joint venture in Irkutsk ($5 billion planned investment); Conoco's Polar Lights
joint venture ($3 billion planned investment); and the various joint ventures planned for
Sakhalin Island. However, there is no guarantee that these joint ventures will come on
line as planned.
"3U.S. DOE-Energy Information Administration (EIA) Analysis Report, Oil and Gas Joint Ventures in
the Former Soviet Union.
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2. Joint Venture Distribution
Overall, joint ventures are distributed disproportionately throughout the former
Soviet Union (see Figure 9). Although Russia accounts for 86 percent of the oil produced
in the former Soviet Union and almost the same proportion of natural gas, only 64 percent
of the joint ventures are located there. The situation is mirrored in the other republics.
Kazakhstan, for example, produces about seven percent of the oil and less than one
percent of the natural gas in the former Soviet Union, but accounts for 1 3 percent of the
joint ventures. Azerbaijan, with three percent of the oil production and one percent of the
natural gas production in these countries, accounts for nine percent of the joint ventures.
The lack of success from joint ventures in Russia reflect the difficulties associated
with conducting business in an economy in transition. Joint ventures have been frustrated
in Russia by export taxes (and high and uncertain taxes in general), the lack of a stable
economic, legal, and political framework conducive to business, and the difficulty in
gaining access to the pipeline network for getting oil out of Russia. With the rising oil
prices in Russia, joint ventures are beginning to lean toward the domestic Russian market
for sales to avoid the export tax and pipeline access issues. 94
Joint ventures such as Sakhalin Island on the Pacific Coast of far East Russia
continue to attract interest because the oil can be exported via tankers, and does not need
94tJ.S. DOE-Energy Information Administration (EIA) Analysis Report, Oil and Gas Joint Ventures in
the Former Soviet Union.
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to travel through the Russian pipeline network.
3. JV Success in the NIS
Joint ventures in the NIS are more successful because their business climate has
been perceived as more favorable to joint ventures than Russia's, and because the
neglected projects left in place by Soviet planners are easier to adapt to new technologies.
However, joint ventures in these republics have also been hurt by the lack of pipeline
access to markets. According to the Russian Ministry of Energy and Transneft, capacities
of the current oil and gas pipelines are not large enough to supply the NIS and Russia at
the same time. So they have instituted (demanded) excessive tariffs to "compensate" for
Russia's downtime. Additionally, the sheer volume potential of the non-Russian republics
make new export pipelines necessary in order to effectively exploit the large ventures in
Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. Moreover under the old Soviet,
Moscowcentric system, all of the oil and gas from the non-Russian republics had to pass
through Russia first, and only then were connections to export pipelines to other countries
available — another example of the total control that Russia had over the former Soviet
Republics' energy resources.
U.S. companies are currently involved in 75 joint ventures, or slightly less than half
of the total. American companies accounted for about half of the joint ventures (54 out of
106) in Russia, but only a little more than a third (21 out of 58) in the other republics.
U.S. companies account for smaller proportions of the joint ventures in Azerbaijan (4 out
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of 13), Kazakhstan (7 out of 22), and Turkmenistan (1 out of 4). 95
C. U.S. GOVERNMENT PROJECTS AND INFLUENCE
The United States government has realized that it is in their best interest to ensure
the outcome of Russia's economic transition. To shape the direction of growth in a truly
dismal economic climate, the U.S. government has taken some initiatives to kick start the
Russian economy and to gain a huge measure of influence into revision of Russian tax
laws, the infamous Production Sharing Agreement, and in general the operation of the
Russian energy industry.
1. U.S. Attempts to Influence the Russian Energy Industry
In 1996, the U.S. Trade & Development Agency awarded four grants to help
industrial and infrastructure improvement projects in Russia.
a. Research Grants
The grants provided $300,000 toward a feasibility study Lockheed Martin
Corp. and Perry Technologies will develop on use of underwater robotic equipment to
work on oil and gas projects in the Barents and Pechora seas.
Smith International Inc., received $150,000 in funding to conduct a
feasibility study of a joint venture to produce drill bits for use in the Russian Federations
oil and gas industries. The Engineering Academy of Russia - Volga Department proposes
95U.S. DOE-Energy Information Administration (EIA) Analysis Report, Oil and Gas Joint Ventures in
the Former Soviet Union.
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to team up with Smith International to manufacture, market, and sell roller cone and shear
bits for the Russian market.
Sovlink Corp, New York, will receive a $200,000 grant to study
requirements for medium term leasing of oil and gas equipment throughout the Russian
Federation. Tokobank will work with Sovlink to design a joint venture.
ABB Lummus Global, will conduct a feasibility study of modernization of a
refinery southeast of Moscow that could result in about $300 million in U.S. exports.
Included will be a plan to improve environmental performance of the plant, as well as a
market analysis for refined products and design and cost of modernization. The Moscow
Refinery will receive the grant of $150,000 for the study. 96
The grants offered by the TDA are relatively small and are more a token of
good will to provide an inroad to the real objective.
b. The U.S. Line of Credit
In July 1996, The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission's Energy Policy
Committee announced that major U.S. financial organizations are willing to provide
Russia with an eight billion dollar credit to develop the fuel and energy sector. Despite the
positive political jargon exchanged regarding the marvelous achievements of the Russian
Duma on reworking the PSA (which acts as a major obstacle to U.S. investment), U.S.
officials made it clear that the opening of a U.S. credit line to Russia is being held up by
960il & Gas Journal, Vol. 94, Iss. 1, Jan. 1, 1996.
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flaws in accounting, taxation, and business legislation. Russian Fuel and Energy Minister
Yurii Shafranik optimistically predicts that by the year 2000 Russian fuel and energy
companies will receive some $12 billion worth of U.S. investment.
In developing a special commission at the Vice Presidential level to deal
with issues regarding U.S. interests in the Russian energy sector, the U.S. is sending an
overt message that it wants to be a major player in resurrecting the ailing industry. Russia
must understand that the U.S. will expect to have a great measure of influence in decisions
regarding Russian foreign investment litigation and policy.
If Russia is willing to allow U.S. intervention in the management of the
industry, it will expedite the economic recovery of the nation, and along with Russia's now
complete privatization effort, rebuild the Russian economy and provide a strong, free
market influence in the global energy market.
This is a great deal to ask of a nation who, less than a decade ago, was
totally at odds with the U.S. both politically and economically. Eight billion dollars, and a
near term solution to Russia's money problems is a lot to offer, but the jury is still out in
Russia as to whether they are ready to sell their energy industry to the U.S.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the text of this thesis, there has been a prominent underlying theme —
Russia's persistent efforts to stifle the free market development of the energy industries of
the former Soviet Union. These efforts have run the political and economic gamut, from
the manipulation of its pipeline system to force participation in energy consortiums in its
former territories, to confounding its own Western energy partners through its nebulous
and restrictive taxation system and PSA legislation, to outright military action.
The health of these nascent economies depends upon the proper development of
their energy resources. The revenues gained through the proper exploitation of oil and gas
can, if invested properly, propel the former Soviet republics into the twenty-first century
as high income economies.
It is crucial that the United States takes the lead in demonstrating that it is in
Russia's own interest to allow the uninhibited exploitation and marketing of these energy
resources. This will be a challenge since Russia (except during the current transition) has
no recent history of free market economics, and it will take some time for them to catch
on. Russia needs to understand that there is plenty of opportunity for marketing energy
resources ~ enough for every nation in the region ~ and that it need not be involved
(either economically or politically) in every regional venture simply because, at one time,
these resources were under its control.
Russia has not shown an ability to properly manage its own energy industry let
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alone those of the near abroad. Recent energy shortages, spawned by lack of capital in
Russia, reached crisis proportions in mid-July of 1996. In Primorskii Krai, in Russia's Far
East, many homes and enterprises were without electricity for long periods. Lack of fuel
oil forced power plants to operate at considerably reduced capacity, resulting in
interruptions in power supplies to various vital installations, including the alarm system on
the Russian-Chinese border and an air traffic control center. On 16 July the area's most
powerful electric power station was producing only 30 megawatts of power, compared
with its usual output of 1,400 megawatts. Some hospitals were cut off for several hours.
Industrial enterprises, street cars, and trolley buses stood idle, and many homes were
without power for up to 16 hours a day. The local power company is owed vast sums by
consumers, and cannot afford to purchase fuel oil or coal. This cash flow problem,
however, is not limited to local economies.
According to Fuel and Energy Deputy Minister Anatolii Kozyrev, the industry's
debt to the 1995 consolidated budget was 26 trillion rubles ($5.7 billion), compared with
the 65 trillion rubles transferred to the budget that year. 97 This was largely due to
customers' non-payments to fuel and energy companies, which reached 105 trillion rubles
in 1995. The sector itself owes more than 127 trillion rubles to other industries. Kozyrev
also noted that because of non-payments by customers, fuel and energy companies lost 15
trillion rubles in profits over the year. As a result, 24% of the enterprises in the sector
970pen Media Research Institute, OMRI Daily Digest, 16 April 1996.
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were run with losses totaling more than two trillion rubles ($ 4.4 million). 98
This is just one symptom of Russian mismanagement. The real problem is in lack
of capital. A report for the Security Council prepared by the government's Financial
Academy concludes that the shortage of capital in Russia is a threat to national security,
and that Russia needs $150 billion to restart economic growth. However, the report states
that this investment capital cannot be generated either domestically or through foreign
investment." Russian economists miss the point when claiming the capital cannot be
raised.
The capital is there, but Russia has put up barriers to prevent Western investment.
Investment obstacles include the deplorable Production Sharing Agreement law. In spite
of the exciting investment opportunities for Western energy concerns, Russia must refine
its PSA law before foreign oil and gas companies will significantly boost upstream
spending. The biggest barrier to investing in upstream oil and gas ventures in Russia is
lack of a clear, stable legal framework. Western oil and gas companies have voiced
dissatisfaction with the PSA law to the highest levels of Russian government. 100 Their
major concerns about Russia's PSA law include:
• Resolving conflicts between the PSA law and Russia's Underground Resources
law.
• Adding a waiver for sovereign immunity.
98Ibid.
"Open Media Research Institute, OMRI Daily Digest, 16 April 1996.
100Oil & Gas Journal, Offshore Accent Predictedfor C.I.S. Projects, Vol. 94, Iss. 25, 17 June, 1996.
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• Guaranteeing that the Russian government will not unilaterally alter oil and gas
PSAs because of changed circumstances.
• Allowing foreign partners in PSAs the unambiguous right to export their shares
of production.
• Interpreting the PSA through internationally accepted legal principles.
• Assuring stable tax treatment for all parties to a PSA.
Another barrier to upstream oil and gas investment in the most promising CIS oil
and gas regions is the issue ofboundary disputes in the Caspian area. Given the area's long
history of territorial conflicts.
Conflict jeopardizing potential oil pipeline routes is occurring in Nagorno-
Karabakh, a small, largely Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan. Karabakh is located on the
potential oil route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. Strife between the mainly Christian
Armenians and Shi'a Muslim Azerbaijanis erupted into war in 1992. The Armenians
continue to strive for complete independence for Karabakh or its absorption into Armenia.
Another potential area of conflict is in Abkhazia, an area of civil unrest and civil
war in Georgia. The war in Abkhazia, began in 1992 and has claimed over 35,000 lives. It
was started when the Russian military backed the Abkhaz separatist minority against the
Georgian government in Tbilisi.
One purpose of Russian intervention was to weaken Georgia and lessen Turkish
and Western influence in the region (the more important reason was the Russian desire to
maintain control of, and access to, oil). Thus, Russia gained de facto control over the
Black Sea coastline in Abkhazia which provides access to the Russian Black Sea ports of
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Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and a nearer proximity to the Georgian oil exporting ports in
Poti, Supsa, and Batumi.
To protect their investments, and reduce political risk in the Caspian region,
Western companies can secure their financial commitments with local government
guarantees of secure export routes from the area.
The U.S. has national security interests in ensuring the fair and prudent
exploitation of the oil resources of the former Soviet Union. Access to Eurasian energy
reserves could reduce America's dependence on Middle East oil and ensure lower oil and
gas prices for decades to come. Moreover, it needs to ensure that Russia does not become
dependent upon its growing arms sales industry as a primary source of income.
The income from the exploitation of these extraordinary energy reserves can
provide Russia and the NTS with the financial resolve to rebuild their dilapidated
infrastructures, retool there industries, and institute badly needed social programs. Thus
leading to greater stability in the region.
The success of all these transitioning economies is dependent on oil and gas. The
United States is renowned for its statebuilding capability. America should try to preserve
the independence and economic viability of the newly independent states by working to
ensure that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and others receive a fair share of oil
revenues from the region. The U.S. should ensure that Russia is not a dominant, but rather
an equal partner in the development of these oil resources. The U.S. has the influence and
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the ability to control the path the Russians take ~ either toward or away from the success
of free market economics. It is essential that we guide them correctly.
It is the right of the Russian oil industry to participate in the development of the
resources within its borders. It is a matter of business and economics as to whether it
should participate in the development of resources elsewhere. After nearly a decade since
the fall of the Soviet regime, it is time the Russians realized that they are a vanquished
adversary — the losers in the cold war --, and like any other defeated empire, they must
resign themselves to the loss of territory and loss of the rights to the natural resources in
that territory.
This is not a condemnation, nor a boast of triumph for the West. It is just a truth.
Further, the results of the cold war have had significant positive implications. The West
has, as it did post WW. II, welcomed post Soviet Russia as a great power in both the
political and economic arenas. It has provided huge amounts of economic aid and opened
previously closed technologies to its former adversary. The West has embarked on a new
Marshal Plan aimed at integrating the former Soviet Union into the free market. Russia
should realize that it has a unique opportunity to grow at the rate of a third world country
with the prestige and experience of a first worlder. Russia — rebuild! Take the assistance
offered by the West in good faith, and grow. The tools are available and whether to let
energy resources expeditiously build a new life for the people of the former Soviet Union
is a choice the Russians must make. However it is the responsibility of the United States to
96
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